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INTRODUCTION
Few would argue, children’s education is one of the most valued pieces
of a successful society’s foundation. Our founding fathers expressed this
idea as they contemplated ways to ensure the survival of our democracy.1
Thomas Jefferson believed a general diffusion of knowledge was
essential to maintain a democratic society.2 In 1779, he proposed a bill
to provide three years of free education to male and female White
children, where they would learn reading, writing, and arithmetic.3 The
Supreme Court of the United States also expressed the essential nature of
education in several famous cases.4 In Brown v. Board of Education,
Chief Justice Warren stated education “is the very foundation of good
citizenship . . . . [I]n these days, it is doubtful that any child may
1. See A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge, 18 June 1779,
FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-02-02-0132-00040079 [https://perma.cc/2RTN-QTCU] (sharing the warning that by not educating the common
people, the nation would be vulnerable to the natural tendency of those with the power of
corruption).
2. Cf. Id. (stating the best way to prevent the corruption by the powerful is “to
illuminate . . . the minds of the people at large . . . .”).
3. See id. (expunging education at the personal expense of the learner by expressing the
importance of teaching certain subjects to males and females with free tuition).
4. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (outlining the significance of
education in today’s society and how it is the basic foundation to a democracy).
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reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity
of an education.”5 In Plyler v. Doe, Justice Brennan says, “education
provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically
productive lives to the benefit of us all . . . . [E]ducation has a
fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society.”6
Yet, despite how much we supposedly value education, the Supreme
Court declined to recognize education as a fundamental right in San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez.7 In Rodriguez, the Mexican
American parents of children attending school in Edgewood ISD brought
an equal protection claim to attack the Texas school finance system.8 The
suit was brought on behalf of school children who are members of
minority groups and come from districts with a low property value base.9
The facts of the case showed a wide disparity in funding between
Edgewood ISD, whose residents were 90% Mexican American and 6%
African American, and Alamo Heights ISD, whose residents were only
18% Mexican American and 1% African American.10 Edgewood ISD
had a property value per pupil averaging $5,960, while Alamo Heights
ISD’s average property value per pupil was more than $49,000.11 These
numbers are significant because they are the bases from which the
districts may tax.12 Though these numbers clearly showed the Texas
school finance system discriminates against districts with low property
wealth, the Court declined to establish wealth as a suspect class.13 In
addition, the Court decided education is not a fundamental right because
it is not adequately related to exercising First Amendment freedoms or

5. Id.
6. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (warning the denial of education to certain groups
and granting it to others has a costly impact on society).
7. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (holding education
is not a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).
8. Id. at 4–5.
9. Id.
10. See id. at 12–13 (summarizing the unequal distribution of money in relation to
percentage of minorities).
11. Id. at 12–13.
12. See id. at 1, 9 (explaining the allocation of funds for expenditures based on the school
district’s ability to tax).
13. See id. at 1, 20 (deciding the discriminated class of persons could not be clearly
identified).
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the right to vote;14 the Court felt if it found otherwise, the rights to
housing and food would deserve fundamental rights status.15
Consequently, the Court applied a rational basis standard rather than a
strict scrutiny standard, and the Texas school finance system passed
muster.16
The holding of this case had numerous negative consequences for the
state of education in the future.17 Had the Court recognized education as
a fundamental right, the Texas Legislature would have been forced to
modify the school finance system so school districts would have equal
opportunity to receive equal funding.18 Though significant progress has
been made in creating a less discriminatory system of funding, Texas
schools are at the mercy of the legislature to ensure consistent funding
without the protection of fundamental rights status.19
In this Comment, I argue without further action, the improvements
made to school finance through House Bill (HB) 3 will not survive the
test of time, and any progress made will be lost to the whim of the
14. But see Ian Vandewalker & Keith Gunnar Bentele, Vulnerability in Numbers: Racial
Composition of the Electorate, Voter Suppression, and the Voting Rights Act, 18 HARV. LATINO L.
REV. 99, 127–34 (2015) (finding a correlation between restrictive voting laws and a state’s racial
composition of minority populations where people of color are more likely to be barred from
participation in the political process due to a higher number of people of color living in poverty
with a limited education).
15. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35–38 (determining appellees’ nexus theory has no logical
limits and questioning, “[h]ow for instance, [whether] education [can] be distinguished from the
significant personal interests in the basics of food and shelter?”).
16. See id. at 58–60 (reasoning how Texas has put forth effort to improve the finance system,
and if the Court were to rule otherwise, it would run the risk of acting as a super legislature).
17. See Mark Yudof, School Finance Reform in Texas: The Edgewood Saga, 28 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 499, 499 (1991) (illustrating the cycle of reform, complacency, inflation and higher
enrollment, disparity, and the push for reform the holding in San Antonio ISD v. Rodriguez failed
to end).
18. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 16–17 (admitting the Texas school finance system would not
withstand strict scrutiny).
19. See, e.g., Albert Kauffman, The Texas School Finance Litigation Saga: Great Progress,
then Near Death by a Thousand Cuts, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 511, 523 (2008) [hereinafter Litigation
Saga] (discussing the equalizing effect of the system of recapture that was developed by the
legislature to address inequities of financial funding for lower wealth school districts).
See generally History of LWVTX Public Education Finance Action, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS
OF TEX., https://my.lwv.org/texas/history-lwvtx-public-education-finance-action [https://perma.cc
/ZW68-RAVN] (documenting instances where the Legislature made cuts to the education budget
for various reasons and then struggled to restore the budget; this timeline shows increases to the
education budget may look positive in a vacuum, but they still may not make up for losses of
previous budget cuts).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar/vol23/iss1/3

4

Castillo: House Bill 3

2021]

HOUSE BILL 3

61

legislature or the volatile nature of overdependency on sales taxes.
Communities of color and communities experiencing poverty are the
populations most impacted by losses to education finance; the students in
these communities cannot afford to rely on promises lacking a concrete
plan. Much of the allure of HB 3 is that the state has volunteered to
contribute more of the money needed for school finance. However,
because there is no long-term method for generating that revenue and
reserving it for education, it could one day amount to nothing more than
an “IOU.” In section II, I will briefly discuss how Texas arrived at the
current state of school finance by looking at the first and last cases of the
Edgewood saga.20 Additionally, I will describe the change in standard
of a constitutional financial system from a measurable one of efficiency
to the ambiguous and unworkable test of arbitrariness. In section III, I
will briefly explain the basic mechanics of school finance. In section IV,
I will discuss the positive and negative aspects of HB 3. Section V will
cover methods that we, as a nation, have taken to address problems within
our system of education and international methods other countries
emphasize to ensure success. In section VI, I offer tangible and intangible
solutions to address the problems with our school finance system in
Texas.
I. HISTORY OF TEXAS SCHOOL FINANCE
The progression of school finance throughout Texas’s history has been
neither linear nor positive.21 The Texas Supreme Court held the school
finance system was unconstitutional in 1989,22 and six challenges later it
held the system met “minimum constitutional requirements” in 2016.23
Funding for Texas public schools was originally intended to be done
equitably.24 In 1876, school funds were apportioned on a per capita
basis.25 For example, the state levied a uniform poll tax to raise money
for the state’s school fund with each student receiving the same amount
20. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
21. See generally Litigation Saga, supra note 19, at 529–52 (discussing the varying
standards the Texas school finance system was subject to over the span of the six Edgewood cases).
22. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 398.
23. Morath v. Tex. Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal., 490 S.W.3d 826, 833 (Tex. 2016)
(upholding “the current school funding regime” despite its undeniable imperfections).
24. See Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 396 (concluding the constitutional framers and ratifiers
intended a system where tax burdens for education costs would be uniformly applied).
25. Id. at 396.
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of funding.26 As cities expanded and the population multiplied, a more
complex system of generating revenue developed.27 In 1883, the Texas
Legislature amended the state Constitution and created school districts
with the power to levy local taxes.28 Currently, all of the property in a
school district is taxed at a rate set by that district.29 The amount of
revenue created depends on how much the districts decide to tax and the
valuation of the property in a given district.30 The facts stated in
Edgewood v. Kirby31 are an excellent example of the inequities that arise
through this method of generating revenue.32
A. Edgewood ISD v. Kirby
The first Edgewood33 case in 1989 was a significant turning point in
the fight for an equitable and efficient financial system.34 In this seminal
case, the Supreme Court of Texas held the Texas school finance system
was unconstitutional because it violated Art. VII § 1 of the Texas
This section provides: “A general diffusion of
Constitution.35
knowledge being essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights
of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to

26. See id. (utilizing the example of the poll tax to depict a method of generating revenue
uniformly applied throughout the state).
27. See id. (detailing the staggering impact on uneven economic development on the school
financing system throughout the state of Texas).
28. See Brian Stork, What About Our Future? The Chaos that is the Texas School Finance
System, 8 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. ON RACE & SOC. JUST. 307, 312 (2006) (explaining the
financial shift when Texas required school districts to supplement revenue granted by the state).
29. See Litigation Saga, supra note 19, at 521 (describing factors that districts are permitted
to consider when setting their tax rates).
30. See id. at 514–15 (stating the equations that compute the amount of money a school will
have to spend on each student rely, in part, on property wealth per student and the tax rate each
district sets).
31. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 392–93.
32. See Albert Kauffman, The Texas Supreme Court Retreats from Protecting Texas
Students, 19 SCHOLAR 145, 147–48 (2017) (referring to Edgewood I and how it led to positive
changes for low-wealth districts).
33. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 394–96.
34. See Stork, supra note 28, at 318–20 (outlining the efforts of the Texas Legislature in
creating a more efficient finance system after Edgewood I).
35. See Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 398 (holding the Texas school financing system violates
the Texas Constitution’s “efficiency” provision). But see Kauffman, supra note 32, at 145
(criticizing the devolution and retreat of the Texas Supreme Court in its refusal to uphold the
standards of the original Edgewood case).
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establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of
an efficient system of public free schools.”36 One of the many reasons
this case left a lasting impression was the way it described the
ramifications children experience when lower income schools are not
well-funded.37 Schools without proper funding often lack important
educational programs.38 To illustrate this point, the Court chose San
Elizario ISD.39 This school district did not have foreign language
classes, pre-kindergarten, chemistry, physics, or calculus.40 In addition,
the district lacked the ability to offer any extra-curricular or enrichment
programs such as band, debate, or even football.41 Meanwhile, highwealth districts are able to enhance children’s learning experiences and
increase their chances of getting higher education because they can afford
to utilize effective programs and tools.42 Some of these advantages
include: more extensive curricula, modern technological equipment,
better libraries, teacher aides, lower student-teacher ratios, better
facilities, and drop-out prevention programs.43

36. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1; see Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 397 (“Children who live in
poor districts and children who live in rich districts must be afforded a substantially equal
opportunity to have access to educational funds. Certainly, this much is required if the state is to
educate its populace efficiently and provide for a general diffusion of knowledge statewide.”).
37. See Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 392–94 (underlying the vast inequities in experience and
opportunity children of low socioeconomic status face).
38. See id. at 393 (presenting the differences in experience children in a low-wealth district
have compared to the experiences of children in a high-wealth district). But cf. San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 51 (1973) (disregarding the effect poor funding has on some
districts and arguing “some inequality . . . is not alone sufficient basis for striking down the entire
system.”).
39. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 393.
40. Id.
41. See id. (listing college preparatory and honors programs as additional unavailable
opportunities).
42. See id. (“The amount of money spent on a student’s education has a real and meaningful
impact on the educational opportunity offered that student.”).
43. See id. (“They are also better able to attract and retain experienced teachers and
administrators.”); see also Corbett Smith, Texas Is Spending Billions More on Education but
Teachers May Not Get the Raises They Expect, DALL. MORNING NEWS (June 30, 2019),
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/education/2019/06/30/texas-is-spending-billions-more-oneducation-but-teachers-may-not-get-the-raises-they-expect/
[https://perma.cc/H4QN-RLCE]
(discussing how school districts are able to remain competitive by offering higher teacher salaries
when funding is increased).
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The Court in Edgewood focused on the meaning of the word
“efficient.”44 The defendants in the case argued “efficient” merely
means “economical” or “inexpensive” and that efficiency is a political
question.45 The Court did not accept this argument and instead noted a
link between equality and efficiency.46 The drafters of the provision in
Article VII likely never contemplated the possibility that a finance system
producing such significant inequalities could be efficient.47 Another
reason Edgewood 48 is such a significant case is because it highlighted
those significant inequalities in a clear and brazen way that was not soon
forgotten.49 During the 1985–1986 school year, spending per student
varied from $2,112 to $19,333.50 At the time, school districts generated
funding for 50% of total education costs.51 School districts generated
this money through ad valorem property taxes.52 In 1985–1986, most
property-rich districts only had to tax $.09 per $100 valuation and were
able to make significantly more money than the most property-poor

44. See Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 394 (defining the different possible meanings of the word
“efficient” because the word would essentially be the test for constitutionality). But see Morath v.
Tex. Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal., 490 S.W.3d 826, 845–55, 863 (Tex. 2016) (focusing on
the “adequacy” of the educational system to determine its compliance with the Texas Constitution,
rather than how “efficient” it is).
45. See Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 393–94 (summarizing the arguments of opposing counsel
which describes the duties of the Legislature and judiciary systems of public school funding). See
generally TEX. CONST. Art. VII, § 1 (“[I]t shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to
establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of
public free schools.”).
46. See Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 397 (“[T]his court has recognized the implicit link that
the Texas Constitution establishes between efficiency and equality”); see also Kauffman, supra
note 32, at 149–50 (reinforcing the assertion that the Edgewood “financial efficiency test” is the
only true measure of long-term enforceable equality in the school system and later decisions have
left a “multiple escape hatch” test designed to defer to the states’ Legislature).
47. See Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 396 (noting the structure of the school finance system
from 1876 through 1886 had neither districts nor other local taxing structures; thus, the burden of
school taxation fell equally and uniformly across the state where each student was entitled to the
same amount of those funds).
48. Id. at 391.
49. See Kauffman, supra note 32, at 147 (listing the series of cases that came after and were
made possible through the profound authority presented in Edgewood I).
50. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 392.
51. See id. (noting “the state provides about forty-two percent” of federal funds in
comparison to other sources of funding).
52. See id. (outlining the gross disparities between districts in their ability to raise property
tax revenue as taxable property wealth varies exponentially between districts).
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district which taxed $1.55 per $100 valuation.53 During the same time
period, the bottom 100 poorest property districts had an average tax rate
of 74.5 cents only to spend $2,978 per student, while the top 100
property-rich districts taxed only 47 cents and were able to spend $7,233
per student.54 School districts clearly did not have equal access to equal
funding.55 Lastly, the Court in Edgewood I suggests local taxation is not
in and of itself a problem.56 Rather, local taxation should be used to
supplement an already efficient school finance system.57 Unfortunately,
the promise of complete finance reform never came to fruition.58 The
ruling in Edgewood 59 was challenged in a series of cases until the matter
was put to rest in Morath v. Texas Taxpayer and Student Fairness
Coalition.60
B. Morath v. Texas Taxpayer (Edgewood VII)
In 2011, the Texas legislature cut school finance funding by over five
billion dollars.61 As a result of the budget cut, school districts brought

53. Id. at 393 (“[T]he property-poor districts with their high tax rates and inferior schools
are unable to attract new industry or development and so have little opportunity to improve their
tax base.”).
54. See id. (applying these figures to illustrate how “[p]roperty-poor districts are trapped in
a cycle of poverty from which there is no opportunity to free themselves.”).
55. See id. at 392 (“The average property wealth in the 100 wealthiest districts is more than
twenty times greater than the average property wealth in the 100 poorest districts.”).
56. See id. at 396 (proclaiming local taxing is an issue because efficiency has not been
maintained through inequities in wealth growth across the state).
57. See id. (“However, we conclude that this provision was intended not to preclude an
efficient system but to serve as a vehicle for injecting more money into an efficient system.”).
58. See Kauffman, supra note 32, at 149 (noting the final case in the Edgewood series,
Morath v. Texas Taxpayer and Student Fairness Coalition, where the Court ruled the school finance
system constitutional).
59. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 398–400.
60. See Kauffman, supra note 32, at 149 (illustrating the latest of seven Texas Supreme
Court decisions examining the state constitutionality of Texas’s school finance system); see also
Morath v. Tex. Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal., 490 S.W.3d 826, 833 (Tex. 2016) (“Judicial
review, however, does not license second-guessing the political branches’ policy choices, or
substituting the wisdom of nine judges for that of 181 lawmakers. Our role is much more limited,
as is our holding: Despite the imperfections of the current school funding regime, it meets minimum
constitutional requirements.”).
61. See Kauffman, supra note 32, at 161 (articulating the Texas Legislature’s decision to
decrease school finance funding by over five billion dollars for the 2012–2013 fiscal year).
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suit in district court.62 At the time, there were a little over a thousand
school districts, and more than half of them participated in the suit.63 The
district court found the school finance system violated the Texas
Constitution in several respects, and, notably, English language learners
and economically disadvantaged students fared the worst in the system.64
The case was taken to the Texas Supreme Court where the Court ruled
the finance system was adequate, suitable, efficient, and in accordance
with the Texas Constitution.65 Though the Court gave strong
commentary on the need for “transformational, top-to-bottom reforms
that amount to more than a Band-Aid” in the school finance system, the
Court declined to enforce the Texas Constitution and prompt change.66
Instead, the Court repeated the mantra that it is not the judiciaries’
responsibility to second-guess the legislature on issues of education
policy.67 It is counterintuitive for the Texas Supreme Court to believe it
would overstep its boundaries if it were to follow the measurable standard
of efficiency.68 The Court chose to presume the finance system is
constitutional and called the “arbitrariness standard” a “very deferential
standard.”69 By saying it is not the place of the Court to “second-guess”
the school finance system, the Court neglects to recognize its role in
maintaining the law of the state is precisely to second-guess the matters

62. Morath, 490 S.W.3d at 833 (“[M]ore than half of the State’s 1,000-plus school districts
have brought the most far-reaching funding challenge in Texas history.”); see Kauffman, supra
note 32, at 162 (exploring how the Legislature’s decision to make the five billion-dollar-cut to
education would set the stage for the Morath litigation).
63. Morath, 490 S.W.3d at 833.
64. See Kauffman, supra note 32, at 162 (explaining the holdings of the district court as
they followed precedent set by Edgewood V1).
65. Morath, 490 S.W.3d at 886; see Kauffman, supra note 32, at 162–63 (describing how
the Texas Supreme Court refused to uphold the district court’s findings that the school finance
system was inadequate, unsuitable, and inefficient).
66. Morath, 490 S.W.3d at 834 (commenting on the imperfect Texas school system and how
Texas school children deserve better).
67. See id. at 833 (emphasizing a judiciaries’ limited role and the need to merely find a
minimum constitutional fulfillment to uphold the Texas school finance system).
68. See id. at 845 (“But we acknowledged substantial evidence ‘that the public education
system has reached the point where continued improvement will not be possible without significant
change,’ and that ‘it remains to be seen whether the system’s predicted drift toward constitutional
inadequacy will be avoided by legislative reaction to widespread calls for changes.’”).
69. Id. at 846 (“Under this ‘very deferential’ standard, we must not substitute our policy
preferences for the Legislature’s . . . .”).
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that come before it.70 Additionally, the Court had no qualms showing a
deferential standard to the Legislature, who itself decides what will
satisfy the Texas Constitution.71 This case marks the Texas Supreme
Court’s commitment to using the “arbitrariness” standard over the
“efficiency” standard set forth in Edgewood I.72 In an analysis of
Edgewood I,73 the Court emphasizes when the finance system was ruled
unconstitutional, the state was not using the system of recapture to help
equalize funding.74 An “arbitrariness” standard weighs heavily in favor
of the state because the Court will only rule against school finance
legislation if it was made arbitrarily and unreasonably.75 Any party who
wishes to challenge the constitutionality of school finance legislation will
find the arbitrariness standard extremely difficult to overcome.76
C. The Failings of Texas’s School Finance System
“Property-poor districts are trapped in a cycle of poverty from which
there is no opportunity to free themselves.”77 At the time of Edgewood
in 1989, school districts lacking property wealth had to compensate by
setting higher property tax rates on the communities in the district.78 The
Foundation School Program is a state program aimed at providing enough
funds for at least a basic education in school districts.79 However, the

70. See id. (recognizing the Court adhered to the standard of reasonableness as a “default
position of deference to the Legislature.”).
71. Id.; see Kauffman, supra note 32, at 166 (depicting the disproportional, illogical
deference the Texas Supreme Court shows the Legislature).
72. Morath, 490 S.W.3d at 845–46 (“Our role is consequential yet confined, strictly
circumscribed by a deferential standard of review, as well as our own prior decisions in this unique
area of the law.”).
73. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
74. See Morath, 490 S.W.3d at 843 (distinguishing the state of school finance in 1989 from
2015).
75. Id. at 846 (furthering the notion that the Legislature will only hold a school financial
system unconstitutional when it is arbitrary).
76. See Kauffman, supra note 32, at 166 (arguing no party challenging a school finance
system is likely to overcome the legal hurdles established by the court).
77. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 393.
78. See id. (“Generally, the property-rich districts can tax low and spend high while the
property-poor districts must tax high merely to spend low.”).
79. Id. at 392 (“Under this program, state aid is distributed to the various districts according
to a complex formula such that property-poor districts receive more state aid than do property-rich
districts.”).
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program failed to cover minimum mandated requirements in 1989.80
When the Foundation Program did not provide enough funds for a basic
education, low-wealth schools were forced to set high tax rates to meet
those minimum requirements.81 High property tax rates are not very
tempting to new developers, so the low-wealth districts have a hard time
increasing their property value and then must tax high to get the needed
revenue.82 The cycle was nearly impossible to break until the
introduction of the “recapture” system.83
II. THE BASIC MECHANICS OF SCHOOL FINANCE
School districts obtain money in a variety of ways—most of it
stemming from local property taxes and state funding.84 A majority of a
district’s budget will come from local property taxes, while the rest is
supplied by the state.85 In 2018, local property owners supplied about
64% of their district’s education budget.86 There is a public perception
that local taxpayers and the state contribute a more or less equal share
towards public education.87 However, in recent years, as property values
rose so did the amount local taxpayers contributed.88 Rather than

80. See id. (extending the Foundation School Program’s hopeful role in ensuring each
district had the funds to give every child a basic education, but expressing its inability to do so due
to poor funding of the program).
81. See id. at 393 (discussing how property-poor districts must tax at higher rates to meet
minimum requirements such as accreditation).
82. See id. (noting that property-poor districts are unable to attract new industry because of
their high tax rates).
83. Litigation Saga, supra note 19, at 577 (purporting the equalizing effect recapture has
had on school districts in Texas and pointing to recapture’s economic benefits for the Legislature
as a funds generator for the state).
84. See Aliyya Swaby, Texas’ School Finance System Is Unpopular and Complex. Here’s
How It Works, TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 15, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2019/02/15/
texas-school-funding-how-it-works/ [https://perma.cc/Q665-FDPJ] (indicating the two main
sources of revenue for school districts are property taxes and state funding).
85. See id. (explaining how school districts first use the property tax and then the state pays
the remaining balance).
86. See id. (describing what a school district’s educational budget is comprised of).
87. See Glenn Hegar, Texas School Finance: Doing the Math on the State’s Biggest
Expenditure, TEX. COMPTROLLER OF PUB. ACCTS. 13 (Jan. 2019), https://comptroller.texas.gov/
economy/fiscal-notes/2019/jan/ [https://perma.cc/Y2U4-W4VB] (explaining the state has only
averaged a 40% contribution from 2000 to 2018).
88. See id. at 6 (providing how property values rose by 128% since 1997, causing Texas’s
public education funding formulas to increase their dependence on local property taxes).
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continuing to contribute the same amount of funding, the state saved
money and was able to contribute less.89 Some have opined the state
should take up more of the burden to pay for public education and
legislators heard them in HB 3.90 Decreasing the public’s property tax
burden was a priority for legislators this session, but the rub is it
automatically increases the burden on the already limited state’s
budget.91 Despite the priority to reduce the public’s burden in property
taxes, the state largely obtains its revenue from the public either way
through sales taxes and other methods.92
While the Texas Constitution grants each school district the power to
levy local taxes, each district’s school board sets the tax rate.93 There
are certain parameters a school district’s board must follow which limits
how much they can tax.94 These parameters are established through the
use of formulas, but a majority of school districts are required to tax at
least $1.00 per $100.00 valuation.95 Tax rates of up to $1.04 do not need
to be approved by local voters, but if a board wants to tax over that, they
will have to call an election.96 In 2018, the maximum tax rate was: $1.17
per $100.00 valuation.97 As of 2018, about 400 school districts maxed
out their taxation rates and were prohibited from increasing taxes due to
state law.98 Property-wealthy school districts that generate significant
revenue at a lower tax rate have to send some of their excess funds back
to the state which is then redistributed to districts with lower property

89. See id. at 13–14 (emphasizing an inverse relationship between state and local funding
where local funding increases, state funding decreases).
90. See id. at 6 (indicating the varied plaintiffs involved demonstrated the wide divergence
of opinions regarding school finance).
91. See id. at 14 (“Texas public education funding formulas have ensured increased
dependence on local property taxes—and a growing burden on homeowners and businesses.”).
92. See id. at 15 (establishing the importance of the general sales tax as a means of revenue
as it has averaged 60.5% of state tax collections since 1993).
93. See Swaby, supra note 84 (stating school boards set tax rates, decide how much to
increase the rates, and get to decide when to ask for voter’s approval or at times may do so without
community input).
94. See id. (recognizing the minimum and maximum tax rates).
95. See id. (explaining how tax rate ratios work in school districts).
96. See id. (outlining how permission is needed from voters if the tax rises above a certain
amount).
97. Id.
98. See id. (emphasizing the tax rate disparity between wealthier and poorer school
districts).
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values.99 The state begins by giving the same amount of money to each
student per average daily attendance in a district—this amount is called a
basic allotment.100 Districts can get more money per each individual
student depending on certain variables, such as whether they fall into a
category of students that are more expensive to teach.101 Examples of
these variables include: students with disabilities, low-income students,
and English language learners.102
III. HB 3
The newest school finance bill, HB 3, was passed June 11, 2019.103
HB 3 received overwhelmingly positive reports from news organizations,
and for a good reason.104 HB 3 has many positive attributes, the most
popular of which is arguably an increase in pay for some teachers.105
Other positive aspects of HB 3 include: support for low-income students
and English language learners who are in dual language programs, giving
districts with low-income students more funding per low-income student,
and increasing funds for special education students.106 Some of the more
negative aspects of the bill include spending $5.2 billion on reducing
local school property taxes, a lack of sustainable sources of funding, and
99. See id. (referring to the system of recapture, which gives poorer school districts a
financial boost).
100. Id.
101. See id. (explaining how districts get extra money for students who fall under certain
categories).
102. See id. (listing various ways districts can get extra money); see also Chandra
Villanueva, School Finance Moves Forward: House and Senate to Work Out Differences in HB 3,
EVERY TEXAN 3 (May 9, 2019), https://everytexan.org/images/2019_EO_CPPP_HB3_Conference
Recs_86.pdf. [https://perma.cc/E9JM-YYJ9] (describing the circumstances surrounding dual
language learners).
103. Leo Lopez, House Bill 3 Implementation Salary Increases, TEX. EDUC. AGENCY
(June 11, 2019), https://tea.texas.gov/sites/default/files/TAA%20-%20House%20Bill%203%20Im
plementation%20Salary%20Increases%206.11.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NUH-35NZ] (describing
the requirements, methodologies, and funding implications under HB 3).
104. See Megan Hempel, House Bill 3 Marks Major Triumph, CORSICANA DAILY SUN
(June 16, 2019), https://www.corsicanadailysun.com/news/house-bill-marks-major-triumph/article
_1a94c13a-8eef-11e9-9528-47518f9d6344.html [https://perma.cc/4Z5Y-RKGG] (“This one law
does more to advance education in the state of Texas than any law that I have seen in my adult
lifetime in the state of Texas.”).
105. Id.
106. See generally Luis Figueroa, Closing Thoughts on HB 3, the Big School Finance Bill,
EVERY TEXAN (May 25, 2019) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Race and
Social Justice) (summarizing the positive and negative aspects of HB 3).
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inequitable tax compression.107 The Center for Public Policy Priorities
(CPPP) suggests spending over $5 billion on reducing local school
property taxes is the “wrong priority,” especially considering the state’s
commitment to buy down school property taxes increases after 2021.108
Lacking a source for sustainable funding will cause unwanted tension
with other parts of the budget,109 and there are school officials who
express unease with making significant changes in their schools to rely
on the new funding.110
A. Inequitable Tax Compression
HB 3 requires Texas school districts to reduce their tier one tax rates
and any tax rate compression required to be applied to the enrichment tax
rates they may have.111 This portion of the bill is identified as the most
disappointing.112 “The tier one tax rate must be reduced by the state
compression percentage which is 93% for the 2019–2020 school
year.”113 Enrichment must be compressed by 0.64834.114 These
changes require districts to lower their tax rates by nearly one percent as

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id. (“The bill lacks a sustainable source of funding for our schools in the future,
which will put more pressure on other parts of the budget.”).
110. See Chevall Pryce, Officials Speak on School Funding, Reform in Texas Legislature,
HOUS. CHRON. (May 10, 2019, 9:17 AM), https://www.chron.com/neighborhood/cyfair/schools/
article/Officials-speak-on-school-funding-reform-in-13835149.php. [https://perma.cc/H4HF-44
W8] (quoting Stuart Snow, chief financial officer for Cy-Fair ISD, saying “when it’s a state
mandated increase you’re dependent upon the sustainability of that funding over a long period of
time . . . . [HB 3] doesn’t give the district any discretion on how [the increase is] to be
funded . . . .”).
111. See Al McKenzie, House Bill 3 Implementation: Tax Rate Compression, TEX. EDUC.
AGENCY (June 11, 2019), https://tea.texas.gov/sites/default/files/TAA%20House%20Bill%203%
20Implementation%20Tax%20rate%20compression%206.11.19.pdf
[perma.cc/FUC4-PW3s]
(illustrating how tax rate calculations under HB 3 will be applied during the 2019 tax year).
112. See generally Chandra Villanueva, School Finance Moves Forward: House and Senate
to Work Out Differences in HB 3, EVERY TEXAN 1–2 (May 9, 2019), https://everytexan.
org/images/2019_EO_CPPP_HB3_ConferenceRecs_86.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/E9JM-YYJ9]
(elaborating how requiring school districts to automatically reduce their tier one tax rates unfairly
benefits wealthier districts where property values have grown significantly faster than poorer
districts).
113. See McKenzie, supra note 111 (discussing how to calculate a district’s maintenance
and operations tax under HB 3).
114. Id.
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their property tax revenues grow.115 This is a problem because districts
with rapidly rising property values can reduce their tax rates faster than
other districts who may not experience the same amount of growth.116
Some districts will be able to do this while remaining fully funded.117
Every Texan, formerly the CPPP, illustrates this concept using Alamo
Heights ISD and Edgewood ISD.118 Alamo Heights, which is more
property-wealthy than Edgewood, would be able to lower its tax rate
much more than Edgewood and still be fully funded while Edgewood
would never be able to do the same without a detrimental effect to its
revenues.119 Consequently, tax compression allows wealthy districts to
refrain from generating revenue that could otherwise help property-poor
schools through recapture.120 Additionally, property-wealthy districts,
which can reduce their taxes, benefit by further attracting businesses and
residents to the area, which also drives their property values up.121
Viewing HB 3’s tax provision through a broader lens, it is also likely to
promote instability and create unnecessary problems.122 Furthermore,
HB 3’s proposed changes to the tax rate are not static.123 Each year, the
115. See id. (illustrating how districts are to implement HB 3’s new requirements when
calculating their tax rates: the sum of (a) the state compression percentage multiplied by $1.00
(93 cents); plus (b) the greater of either the district’s tax effort exceeding more than $1 minus any
enrichment tax rate compression or 4 cents; plus (c) the district’s current debt rate).
116. See Villanueva, supra note 112 (highlighting the inherent advantage HB 3 grants to
districts in areas with rapid property tax growth have over areas with low property growth).
117. See id. (demonstrating how the rate of property tax increases in an area will influence
a district’s ability to reduce their tax rate).
118. See id. (comparing the disparity of financial outcomes between school districts in the
same metro area utilizing HB 3’s new requirements).
119. See id. (describing the unequal outcomes between property-rich districts and poverty
poor districts). Compare Edgewood ISD District Profile, TEX. TRIB., https://schools.texastribune.
org/districts/edgewood-isd-bexar/ [https://perma.cc/YCW8-F5S7] (reporting 94.7% of Edgewood
ISD’s students are considered economically disadvantaged), with Alamo Heights ISD District
Profile, TEX. TRIB., https://schools.texastribune.org/districts/alamo-heights-isd/ [https://perma.cc/
4CP9-3CDH] (reporting 19.4% of Alamo Heights ISD’s students are considered economically
disadvantaged).
120. Villanueva, supra note 112.
121. See generally Cory Turner, Why America’s Schools Have a Money Problem, NPR
(Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/04/18/474256366/why-americas-schools-have-amoney-problem [https://perma.cc/GM5F-ZAMA] (surveying general trends across the United
States of underfunded schools and the tax structures that perpetuate them).
122. See Villanueva, supra note 112 (predicting HB 3’s tax reforms—specifically those for
Tier II—will evolve into an unequitable funding system).
123. See Patrick Svitek, Gov. Greg Abbott Signs $11.6 Billion School Finance Measures
into Law, TEX. TRIB., (June 11, 2019 11:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2019/06/11/texas-
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districts will be required to recalculate their tax rates, and every year the
tax rates will decline.124 HB 3’s tax reforms will make it much more
difficult for the state to supplement school districts for their losses,
especially when tax revenues decline and educational needs remain
constant or grow.125 An increased burden on the state may seem like a
relief, but the reality is that a commitment to pay more over time reduces
the state’s ability to make future investments.126 All districts should
have equal access to revenue at similar tax rates because Texas courts
have agreed every child is promised a similar quality of education.127
The tax compression provision in HB 3 is a negative aspect of the bill
because it plays favorites with property-wealthy districts instead of
promoting fairness and putting “the same equal effort into supporting
public education.”128
Some may question the significance of this section.129 Why does it
matter that some school districts can lower their property taxes at
a rate faster and more significantly than other schools?130 If a district
pays more taxes, they should be able to reap the exclusive benefits,
right?131 For those who want to ignore the problems others face, this
gov-greg-abbott-signs-116-billion-school-finance-measure-law/ [https://perma.cc/8JPK-6ELX]
(reporting lawmakers’ estimations that HB 3 “will lower tax rates by an average of 8 cents per $100
dollar valuation in 2020 and 13 cents in 2021.”).
124. See id. (reporting HB 3’s tax reforms will provide “a tax cut of $200 for the owner of
the $250,000 home in 2020 and $325 in 2021.”).
125. See Villanueva, supra note 112 (suggesting HB 3’s tax reforms will reduce the amount
available for the state to fund public education).
126. See id. (“[R]educ[ing] tax rates each year will increase the state’s share of education
funding. However, it will also make it harder for the state to make future investments in the
classroom as more and more state dollars will be needed to ensure funding stays level as tax rates
decline.”).
127. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989) (“Children
who live in poor districts and children who live in rich districts must be afforded a substantially
equal opportunity to have access to educational funds.”).
128. See Villanueva, supra note 112 (highlighting the need for all districts to play a role in
reforming public education funding in Texas).
129. See Svitek, supra note 123 (quoting Governor Greg Abbott on HB 3’s passage: “We
did something that was considered to be highly improbable, and that is to be able to transform
public education in the state of Texas without a court order forcing us to do so.”).
130. See Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 397 (holding that adequate educational funding is
“required if the state is to educate its populace efficiently and provide for a general diffusion of
knowledge statewide.”).
131. See McKenzie, supra note 111 (stating the voting requirements of district tax rates
under HB 3).
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view may make perfect sense—but it is not justified.132 A district’s tax
base comes from the values of individuals’ private property, but it also
comes from commercial property value in the area and revenue generated
from these wealthy areas is not always the claimable achievement of
families that live in them.133 Where children grow up and what school
district they become a part of is usually happenstance.134 Families do
not always have the means to relocate to a “better” school district, and
there is no guarantee parents will be involved enough in their children’s
education to take action concerning this issue.135 Children do not control
which school district they are brought up in; mere luck should not
determine the quality of education they receive.136 If, we as a Texan
community believe in this maxim, our community and government
leaders need to grapple with questions of inequality collectively.137
B. Changes to the Recapture Program
One significant modification to the Texas school finance system made
possible by the Edgewood138 cases is the introduction of a system called
“recapture.”139 Recapture involves property-wealthy school districts
sharing their property tax revenues with lower income districts or with
the state to redistribute the funds.140 School districts that generate over
$700,000 must participate in recapture.141 Property-wealthy school
districts and those who have a stake in the matter often view recapture as
132. See Svitek, supra note 123 (quoting Governor Greg Abbott on HB 3’s passage: “You
could not overstate the magnitude of the law that I’m about to sign because this is a monumental
moment in public education history in the state of Texas.”).
133. Hegar, supra note 87, at 7 (“[H]igh property value isn’t necessarily a function of
residential real estate values.”).
134. See generally id. (referring to a child’s inability to choose which school district they
prefer to go to school in).
135. Id. at 12 (indicating the number of students classified as economically disadvantaged
is increasing).
136. See id. at 7 (suggesting a student’s zip code should not determine the quality of
education they receive).
137. See id. at 5 (criticizing the efforts of our community and local government regarding
their efforts in ceasing inequality within our education system).
138. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
139. Litigation Saga, supra note 19, at 523 (explaining the origination of recapture).
140. Id. (detailing the requirements of the system of recapture).
141. See id. at 523–524 (detailing how the “state system would be enriched” if recapture is
mandated for school districts with over $700,000, a level exceeded by more than ten percent of
school districts.)
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a negative aspect of school finance that must be remedied.142 These
districts see their recapture payment increase and perhaps feel the
payments they must make are unjust.143 Some criticisms of recapture
are that in many cases it will result in higher local property taxes, it causes
a “de facto cap” on school expenditures, and it is possible wealthier
schools will stop taxing themselves at higher rates as they are essentially
paying more for other districts.144 However, recapture has been very
efficient in decreasing inequalities among Texas school districts.145
Before the institution of the recapture system, the 100 wealthiest school
districts averaged nine times the funding as the 100 poorest schools.146
As of 2018, the top 100 wealthiest school districts only have 1.26 times
as much funding as the 100 least wealthy schools.147
One concerning change regarding the effect of HB 3 on the state
finance system includes lowering recapture payments by an estimated
$3.6 billion over the next two years.148 This reduction in recapture is
projected to be achieved using a variety of methods.149 First, HB 3 will
change the way recapture is calculated.150 Prior to HB 3, recapture was
calculated by measuring equalized wealth levels.151 One criticism of that
method is recapture and non-recapture districts were treated differently
142. See Don’t Get Distracted by Recapture: Our Biggest School Finance Challenge Is a
Lack of Revenue, EVERY TEXAN (Nov. 13, 2018), http://bettertexasblog.org/2018/11/dont-getdistracted-by-recapture-our-biggest-school-finance-challenge-is-a-lack-of-revenue/ [https://perma
.cc/LQ7D-W2FJ] [hereinafter Don’t Get Distracted] (analyzing and identifying the pitfalls and
criticisms of the system of recapture).
143. See id. (opining that wealthy districts become discouraged with increased payments
and do not see the value or return in them).
144. See Mark Yudof, School Finance Reform in Texas: The Edgewood Saga, 28 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 499, 503 (1991) (exploring the possible remedies of an inefficient school finance system
and considering the ramifications of those remedies).
145. See Don’t Get Distracted, supra note 142 (noting the system of recapture has “leveled
the playing field” and has given more students the “chance to compete and succeed in life.”).
146. See id. (“Before recapture, the 100 wealthiest school districts had, on average, nine
times as much funding as the 100 lowest wealth districts.”).
147. Id.
148. See Recapture Formula Changes and Reductions Under House Bill 3, TEX. EDUC.
AGENCY (July 25, 2019), https://tea.texas.gov/sites/default/files/TAA%20-%20Recapture%20pur
suant%20to%20House%20Bill%203.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YGY-VPSU] [hereinafter Recapture
Formula Changes] (identifying funding implications of passing HB 3).
149. Id.
150. Id. (“The calculation of recapture is now based on local revenue in excess of
entitlement instead of equalized wealth levels . . . .”).
151. Id. (distinguishing the new calculation method compared to the old one).
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because non-recapture districts did not benefit from the “Available
School Fund” the same way recapture schools did.152 Now, recapture
calculations will be based on local revenue in excess of a school district’s
entitlement level.153 The second way recapture will be reduced is
through increasing entitlement amounts; examples of these allotments are
increased money for special education and dual language.154 Since
recapture calculations no longer count entitlements for wealthier schools
as part of their recapture payments, those schools ultimately pay less.155
The third method for decreasing recapture payments is to outright lower
property taxes.156 Lowering taxes will always be welcoming news to
many, but schools need a sustainable source of funding.157
Whittling away at this source of funding will only make it more
difficult to meet the needs of children, teachers, and staff.158 While
districts that must make high recapture payments get relief from this bill,
it comes at a cost.159 Now that the state is removing this source of
funding, the state is putting the onus on itself to replace that loss of
funding.160 Unfortunately, the plan for the state to make up the
difference in the future is unreliable.161 Possible dips in the economy
and the pressures of appeasing multiple parties when budget planning
contributes to the turbulent nature of the Legislature.162 Although the
152. Id. (addressing the criticism of the old method of calculating recapture).
153. Id.
154. See id. (explaining the creation of new allotments and expansion of old allotments).
155. See id. (recognizing how HB 3 school districts are treated more equitably and how
districts will only pay for recapture on the amount above their formula entitlement).
156. Id.
157. See Figueroa, supra note 106 (emphasizing HB 3’s focus on lowering property taxes
as misplaced).
158. See id. (expressing the negative impact attributed to lowering property taxes and how
its effect will be harmful to schools in the future by “adding more pressure on other parts of the
budget.”).
159. See Hannah Elsaadi, The Cost of Education: An in Depth Look into Texas’s Education
Funding System over the Last Two Decades, 2 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. 341, 353, 377 (2015)
(analyzing how the differences in size and wealth make it difficult to create efficiency).
160. See Figueroa, supra note 106 (stating the state’s burden under HB 3 is large and will
be even larger by 2021).
161. See generally Elsaadi, supra note 159, at 356 (recognizing the Texas Legislature’s
efforts in finding solutions to remedy the lack of school funding have proven to be unsuccessful).
162. See History of LWVTX Public Education Finance, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF
TEX., https://my.lwv.org/texas/history-lwvtx-public-education-finance-action [https://perma.cc/
ZW68-RAVN] (noting the consequences of the economic downturn in 2008–2011). See generally
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Legislature may have the best intentions to supply funding, without a
more concrete plan, schools relying on revenue from recapture may get
the raw end of the deal.163 One positive change to the recapture formula
is that it will now use current year values rather than prior year values.164
Using prior year values was problematic because it contributed to budget
instability.165
C. HB 3 Lacks a Sustainable Source of Funding
In many ways, HB 3 is a step in the right direction for public school
finance, but lawmakers should not become complacent.166 Increases in
funding are not guaranteed beyond 2021 because the bill relies heavily
on nonrecurring sources of funding.167 This legislative session, school
finance was one of the most important issues discussed.168 This was
because underfunded Texas schools, underpaid Texas school employees,
and other interest groups put a significant amount of pressure on
lawmakers to address the problem.169 Without that significant pressure
or a court order, the Texas Legislature will likely be less willing to

Figueroa, supra note 106 (describing the pressures on the budget that will occur as the state puts
the onus on itself in order to relieve property taxes).
163. See Elsaadi, supra note 159, at 356, 359 (describing instances where the Legislature
attempted to find a solution to education financing and failed).
164. See Recapture Formula Changes, supra note 148 (demonstrating how the prior method
created budget instability and deficits).
165. See id. (describing how budget instability, including budget deficits, were caused by
the old method of recapture).
166. See Public Education Reforms Lack Financial Sustainability, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS
NEWS (June 11, 2019, 4:29 PM), https://www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/editorials/article/Publiceducation-reforms-lack-financial-13969323.php [https://perma.cc/C3HC-EG2C] (urging state law
makers to adopt public education reforms that will be warranted in the years down the road and
reiterating public education “should not be dealt with only” when “in crisis mode.”).
167. See id. (introducing further cause for concern given the state’s history of giving and
taking away funds in the past).
168. Id.
169. See Rebekah Allen, Texas Lawmaker Who Almost Quit After Failed School Overhaul
Bill Back with Transformative Plan, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Apr. 24, 2019, 5:45 PM),
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2019/04/24/texas-lawmaker-who-almost-quit-afterfailed-school-overhaul-bill-back-with-transformative-plan/ [https://perma.cc/Z3ME-466E] (noting
the pressure to deliver, especially considering how the 2009 Legislature gave teachers a modest
salary increase, but then completely took it away with the cuts made in 2011).
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increase funding again on its own.170 Without a sustainable and longterm plan to continue funding for teachers and new allotments, it will
become increasingly harder for the legislature to pay for the changes HB
3 has made.171 These difficulties arise due to changing demographics
and inflation.172 Funding education may easily become less of a priority
to the Legislature as they have many significant issues to deal with, and
all compete for funding.173
The risk that funding from HB 3 will be discontinued after 2021 is not
mere speculation.174 Texas history reveals many instances where state
funding was granted and then repealed a few years later.175 In 2006,
Governor Rick Perry called a special session for school finance to find a
solution for the lack of funding.176 Two months prior, the Texas
Supreme Court found the Texas school finance system
Governor Perry introduced the Educational
unconstitutional.177
Excellence and Equity Plan (EEAEP).178 This plan included granting
relief to taxpayers by lowering the residential cap to $1.25 per $100
property valuation.179 The plan also aimed to eliminate recapture and
split a district’s tax base for separate caps on commercial and residential
170. See Public Education Reforms Lack Financial Sustainability, supra note 166 (stating
that without a court order forcing them to do so, state lawmakers have not been very good at
addressing the issue of school funding).
171. See id. (reiterating the fear lawmakers will cut large amounts of funding to public
education as they have similarly done in the past when crisis strikes).
172. See id. (describing how shifting priorities in the Legislature have failed students in the
past); see also Figueroa, supra note 106 (detailing how HB 3 accounts for inflation).
173. See Elsaadi, supra note 159, at 342 (acknowledging the Texas Legislature failed to
prioritize education finance for decades, and, as a result, schools have been negatively affected by
the Legislature’s “trial and error” approach); see also Public Education Reforms Lack Financial
Stability, supra note 166 (asserting that other priorities may take attention away from school
financing).
174. See Elsaadi, supra note 159, at 355–69 (detailing how Texas’s history shows a myriad
of failed attempts to address issues with the finance system).
175. See, e.g., id. at 359–62 (recounting the events leading up to the significant cuts to the
education budget in 2011).
176. Id. at 361.
177. See Neely v. West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist, 176 S.W.3d 746, 800 (Tex.
2005) (declaring increased school funding must be accompanied by structural changes); see also
Elsaadi, supra note 159, at 361 (underlining the unconstitutionality of the state property scheme
used for public school funding).
178. See Elsaadi, supra note 159, at 361 (crediting Governor Perry for his proposed
Educational Excellence and Equity Plan as a possible remedy to the finance problem).
179. Id.
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property.180 To make up for lost revenue from the property taxes, a
business margins tax and increased cigarette tax was implemented.181
The EEAEP included a provision for Additional State Aid for Tax
Reduction (ASATR).182 The ASATR’s goal was to account for money
school districts lost as a result of the EEAEP that was not covered by the
business margins and cigarette taxes.183 Unfortunately, these taxes were
not enough to offset the property tax losses, and the state had to utilize
ASATR much more than it expected.184 These unexpected expenditures
contributed to a need for extensive cuts to the education budget in
2011.185
1.

Watching History Repeat

HB 3 is similar in many respects to Rick Perry’s Educational
Excellence and Equity Plan and may have similar negative consequences
unless further action is taken.186 One of the main ways the bills are
similar is the emphasis on lowering property taxes and reducing or
eliminating recapture payments.187 Provisions like these are popular
with taxpayers; however, they pull school finance bills in too many
directions.188 Just as HB 3 puts the onus on the state to make up the
180. See id. (listing the main components of the Educational Excellence and Equity Plan).
181. See id. (describing the financial strategies employed by the state to help supplement
public school funding).
182. Id. at 362 (2015).
183. See id. (detailing how the budget shortfalls caused by the EEAEP would be covered
by ASATR).
184. See id. (addressing the financial consequences public schools faced in the aftermath of
the EEAEP).
185. Id.
186. Compare id. (stating the main tenants of the Educational Excellence and Equity Plan),
with Figueroa, supra note 106 (highlighting the lack of sustainable sources of funding for Texas
public schools stemming from HB 3).
187. See generally 2004 Special Session on School Finance, PLANO INDEP. SCH. DIST.
(Apr. 22, 2004), https://www.pisd.edu/site/Default.aspx?PageID=1740 [https://perma.cc/SPG28FHL] (extrapolating the key aspects of the Educational Excellence and Equity Plan).
188. See Ross Ramsey, Analysis: There’s a Reason Texas Governors Keep Failing to Lower
Property Taxes, TEX. TRIB. (Jan. 17, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/
01/17/analysis-theres-reason-texas-governors-keep-failing-lower-property-tax/
[https://perma.cc/MX64-GVW6] (describing the political importance of lower property taxes to the
residents of Texas). See generally Kiah Collier, 2011 Budget Cuts Still Hampering Schools, TEX.
TRIB. (Aug. 31, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2015/08/31/texas-schools-stillfeeling-2011-budget-cuts/ [https://perma.cc/E77Q-7C55] (detailing how districts are still tackling
staffing cuts, swelling class sizes, and flat test scores aggravated by the 2011 budget cuts).
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revenue losses caused by reductions in property taxes and recapture
payments, the EEAEP did the same and had disastrous results.189 The
Legislature may mean well, but ultimately, consistent funding requires a
tangible, efficient plan for generating revenue because when outside
variables negatively affect the state’s budget, Texas schools should have
more to fall back on than what amounts to an IOU.190 In 2011, the state
cut 5.4 billion dollars from the education budget.191 Although the state
tried to make up for the cuts in subsequent years, it never fully removed
the lingering effects.192
In 2013, the state granted a $3.4 billion increase, but it was not enough
to help Texas schools recover from the negative effects of the 2011
budget cuts.193 In 2015, school staffing, classroom sizes, per student
funding, and test scores were all still negatively impacted and indicative
that despite the remedial increases, school districts were still inadequately
funded.194 Public school staffing was still lower by 3,700 teachers, while
enrollment steadily increased by more than 220,000 students.195 Texas
was also still experiencing a substantial increase in waivers to allow
campuses to exceed the twenty-two student class size limit.196 High
stakes testing scores saw little to no improvement with success rates in
the seventieth percentile, while many school districts had still not
achieved pre-2011 per student funding.197 Considering the national
average for amount spent per student on education was $12,040 in 2015,

189. See Aliyya Swaby, Teacher Raises and All-day Pre-K: Here’s What’s in the Texas
Legislature’s Landmark School Finance Bill, TEX. TRIB. (May 24, 219, 9:00 PM),
https://www.texastribune.org/2019/05/24/texas-school-finance-bill-here-are-details/
[https://
perma.cc/8XDC-7CH6] (reporting how the budget cuts are accounted).
190. See PLANO INDEP. SCH. DIST., supra note 187 (identifying the need for a long-term
school financing plan).
191. Collier, supra note 188.
192. See id. (acknowledging that schools continued to struggle years after the 2011 budget
cut).
193. Id.
194. See id. (reporting how public schools are still struggling with 2011 budget cuts in the
education system despite the Legislature’s attempt to adequately allocate funds).
195. Id.
196. See id. (“The state still is approving far more waivers allowing elementary schools to
exceed a 22-student class size limit established in 1984. Last year, the total number of campuses
requesting waivers exceeded 2,100, according to state data; In the five school years leading up to
the 2011 budget cuts, it never topped 1,375.”).
197. Id.
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and Texas was spending $9,559 per student, pre-2011 spending was a low
benchmark.198
2.

Teachers and Students are Affected by a Lack of Sustainable Funding

In addition to affecting students, a lack of reliable and sustainable
funding also negatively affects teachers and other school employees.199
Because HB 3 requires districts to set aside a certain percentage of money
for increases in salary, the districts’ hands will be tied if in two years they
are unable to afford the new raises.200 As a result of this instability,
many school districts are attempting to be conservative with school
employees’ raises, and school employees are not getting the economic
help they were anticipating from the bill.201
Many school employees expressed their excitement for receiving a
salary increase.202 However, some have also expressed disappointment
they did not qualify for an increase or did not get the raise they expected
to receive.203 HB 3 requires school districts increase salaries for certain
staff as laid out in Section 48.051(c) of the Education Code.204 The code
states:

198. See id. (noting Texas is in the bottom one-third in the nation for per-student funding).
199. See Aliyya Swaby, With Conflicting Budget Estimates, Will Texas Teachers Get the
Pay Raises They Anticipated?, TEX. TRIB. (July 3, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/
2019/07/03/teacher-pay-raises-school-district-budgets/
[https://perma.cc/4RKK-65SV]
(describing difficult choices districts must make regarding funding notwithstanding awareness that
in two years, the funding may change or no longer exist).
200. See id. (emphasizing the substantial contrast between earlier district budget estimates
and calculations the districts did themselves while reporting that some districts are coming up
short).
201. See, e.g., id. (demonstrating how Houston ISD’s 3.5% raise equates to less than a
$100.00 raise per paycheck).
202. See, e.g., Corbett Smith, Texas Is Spending Billions More on Education but Teachers
May Not Get the Raises They Expect, DALL. MORNING NEWS (June 30, 2019), https://www.dallas
news.com/news/education/2019/06/30/texas-is-spending-billions-more-on-education-but-teachers
-may-not-get-the-raises-they-expect/
[https://perma.cc/H4QN-RLCE]
(discussing
the
misconception teachers would get a uniform $5,000 raise to their annual salary).
203. See id. (detailing how the funding mandated by HB 3 will to some extent be applied
according to the discretion of the school districts).
204. Act of June 12, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., H.B. 3, § 1.021(c); accord Leo Lopez,
House Bill 3 Implementation Salary Increases, TEX. EDUC. AGENCY (June 11, 2019),
https://tea.texas.gov/sites/default/files/TAA%20-%20House%20Bill%203%20Implementation%2
0Salary%20Increases%206.11.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NUH-35NZ] (summarizing the funding
allocation mandates within HB 3).
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A school district must use at least 30 percent of the amount . . . that equals
the product of the average daily attendance of the district multiplied by the
amount of difference between the district’s funding under this chapter per
student in average daily attendance for the current school year and the
preceding school year to provide compensation increases to full-time
employees other than administrators.205

In addition, the funds are prioritized to classroom teachers that have more
than five years’ experience.206 Although school districts must follow
section 48.051 of the Education Code, they are given considerable leeway
on how to distribute the funds.207 The funds themselves do not need to
be given as a salary increase, as districts have the option of increasing
benefits instead.208 For example, Frisco ISD is increasing medical
premium contributions by $25 more per employee.209 Many speculated
the salary increases would be a uniform $5,000 across the board, but this
was not the case.210 Because of the way the salary increase formula is
built, some schools will get much more funding for this purpose than
others, and the result is that many teachers will not get much of a salary
increase at all.211 School districts that are allotted more money under the
formula are able to give significant increases such as Barbers Hill ISD
(outside of Houston), the first district in Texas to raise starting teacher
pay to $60,000.212 Other districts who are less favored by the formula—
like Plano ISD (in the Dallas area)—are only able to offer a 2.5% pay
raise to teachers with fewer than 6 years’ experience and a 3% increase

205. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 48.051 (2019).
206. See Lopez, supra note 204 (confirming 75% of funds will go to teachers with more
than five years of experience).
207. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 202 (expressing that although teachers must receive a
portion of the new funds schools are receiving, the school districts will be able to decide how to
distribute them to a certain degree as well as what to do with any funds in excess of the mandated
minimum).
208. See id. (acknowledging how large contributions to employee insurance premiums in
Texas serve as a loophole to giving school employees a definite pay increase).
209. See id. (noting that spending an overwhelming $1.8 million dollars only equates to an
insignificant “raise” for school employees).
210. See id. (recounting the legislative history of HB 3 and explaining that the uniform
$5,000 was considered as a viable plan but was then defeated in the House).
211. See id. (“A third of the state’s districts and charters won’t get more than $450,000 in
additional formula funding . . . .”).
212. Id.
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to teachers with more than 6 years’ experience.213 Additionally, there
are concerns about the longevity of the funding for salary increases and
some are fearful if the state experiences economic hardship, teacher and
other school employees’ salaries will be affected.214 Prior to HB 3, the
last time teachers received a material increase was in 2009.215 Due to
the economic recession, the Legislature then cut $5.4 billion from the
education budget just two years later in 2011.216
Teachers and other school employees are long overdue for salary
increases, and the HB 3 salary increases are absolutely welcome.217
However, the salary increase provided for in HB 3 does nothing to
improve the disparity in teacher and staff salaries between districts.218
In fact, the HB 3 salary increase may exacerbate these issues.219
Wealthier districts already paying their teachers at the national average
will be able to increase salaries even higher while poorer districts will
struggle to pay their teachers the national average.220 The effect is that
wealthier districts are better able to attract valuable employees and retain
them longer.221
213. Id.
214. See Julie Chang, Why Some Aren’t Sold on Giving Teachers a $5,000 Raise,
STATESMAN (Jan. 17, 2019, 6:17 PM), https://www.statesman.com/news/20190117/why-somepeople-arent-sold-on-giving-texas-teachers-5000-raise [https://perma.cc/3DS3-AH2N] (“[A]n
economic downturn could easily eliminate funding for teacher pay.”).
215. See id. (explaining how the raises given to teachers in 2009 were undercut by budget
cuts in 2011 which caused teachers to be laid off).
216. See id. (describing how budget cuts during the recession lead to attrition); see also
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF TEX., supra note 162 (detailing how the 2013 Legislature was
under pressure to fix education financing).
217. See LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF TEX., supra note 162 (providing a timeline of
education finance in Texas); see also Aliyya Swaby, Can Pay Raises Help Rural Texas Districts
Like Buffalo Retain Teachers?, TEX. TRIB. (May 17, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.
org/2019/05/17/texas-teacher-pay-raises-small-districts-retain-staff/ [https://perma.cc/U4CQ-B5
DC] [hereinafter Rural Texas Districts] (giving examples of teachers and other school staff who
struggle to make ends meet).
218. See Rural Texas Districts, supra note 217 (depicting the difficulties one district has
attempting to compete with districts that use higher salaries to attract employees).
219. See id. (“[C]ompetitors will also have more money to spend on bonuses and raises,
making it challenging for the tiny district to come out on top.”).
220. See id. (predicting one small school district will still struggle to compete since the
funding will be distributed equally to all school districts if HB 3 passes).
221. See Desiree Carver-Thomas & Linda Darling Hammond, Teacher Turnover:
Why It Matters and What We Can Do About It, LEARNING POL’Y INST. v–vi (Aug. 2017),
https://learningpolicyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/product-files/Teacher_Turnover_REPORT.pd
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In Buffalo ISD, the base pay for a starting teacher is $15,000 less than
the state average.222 The superintendent of the district drives the school
bus every day for three hours in the morning and three hours in the
afternoon because the district has struggled to find a licensed bus driver
willing to take on the position.223 This occurrence is worrisome,
considering the school district in Buffalo, as in many other small towns,
is the main employer.224 Though Buffalo ISD will be able to increase
employee salaries under HB 3, it will still be pressed to attract new
teachers and fill positions when neighboring districts are also able to pay
more.225 Differences in pay contribute to an “employment drought”
problem.226 One concern is this disparity in pay ultimately affects the
quality of education children receive.227 Buffalo ISD has also had
trouble filling bilingual teaching positions, which affects the quality of
English language learning students’ educations.228
In sum, while salary increases are a positive aspect of HB 3, in many
cases they will not be enough to decrease the pay gap between poor
school districts and the national teacher salary average; they do not
address the disparity in pay between Texas school districts, and the
sustainability of funding for these increases is in question.229
f [https://perma.cc/5C4B-3XHP] (reporting national teacher turnover rates are 50% higher in Title
1 schools who serve lower income populations and recommending increased compensation
packages as a means of curbing the turnover).
222. Rural Texas Districts, supra note 217.
223. See id. (emphasizing this is not an uncommon occurrence throughout rural Texas
districts).
224. Id.
225. See id. (comparing with how other school districts will also receive funding for raises
and bonuses under HB 3).
226. See id. (stating how one school district was hoping for more money to recruit teachers
and end the employment draught); see also Carver-Thomas & Hammond, supra note 221, at 32
(“[T]eachers in districts with a maximum teaching salary greater than $72,000 are 20–31% less
likely to leave their schools than those with maximum salaries under $60,000.”).
227. See Carver-Thomas & Hammond, supra note 221, at vii, 1 (describing the heavy toll
teacher turnovers have on students even if the teacher just moves to another school, because in a
pinch, schools will often hire inexperienced or unqualified teachers; this, coupled with the
instability students experience, impacts their learning).
228. See Rural Texas Districts, supra note 217 (addressing the growing need for bilingual
teachers as the number of Hispanic students has more than doubled since 2003).
229. See generally id. (discussing disparities between a rural Texas district and the national
average compared to other Texas districts); see Chang, supra note 214 (discussing disparities
between Texas districts and the national average where “an economic downturn could easily
eliminate funding for teacher pay.”).
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IV. WHERE DO WE LOOK FOR GUIDANCE?
In the United States, people are accustomed to viewing the country as
a leader in the world, at the forefront of success.230 However, the United
States trails behind other countries when it comes to providing students
with a quality education.231 In international rankings, the United States
is near the bottom middle of the list and is ranked behind countries such
as Estonia and Slovenia.232 This difference in quality has continued
more than fifty years after the official end of segregation.233 In 2013,
the National Assessment of Educational Progress showed the average
Black student in the twelfth grade was reading at a level equivalent to the
average White student in the eighth grade.234
A. Nationally
The problems with our education system have not been ignored; the
United States has attempted to address these issues at the national and
statewide level.235 At the national level, presidents have taken action,
such as the “No Child Left Behind Act” initiated by President Bush in
2001 and “Race to the Top” initiated by President Obama in 2012.236
U.S. courts have favored the idea states should be free to serve as
laboratories for policy which, if successful, may lead to the adoption of
these laws by other states or even the federal government.237 While the

230. See Is America Still the Leader of the Free World? PBS, https://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/third-rail/episodes/episode-3-should-america-be-the-worlds-cop/america-leader-free-world/
[https://perma.cc/Q4DR-67XQ] (reporting 67% of Americans consider the United States to be the
leader of the free world).
231. Jal Mehta, Why American Education Fails: And How Lessons from Abroad Could
Improve It, 92 FOREIGN AFF. 105, 106 (2013).
232. See id. (“U.S. schools still languish in the middle of international rankings . . . .”).
233. See id. at 105, 106 (2013) (explaining the average black twelfth grader scores on an
equivalent level as the average white eighth grader on the National Assessment of Educational
Progress).
234. See id. (“[H]alf a century after the end of official segregation, huge gaps continue to
divide students by race and class, with the average black 12th grader scoring in reading at a level
equivalent to the average white eighth grader on the National Assessment of Educational
Progress . . . .”).
235. See id. (referring to recent federal level education reforms initiated by American
presidents).
236. Id. at 105–07 (2013).
237. James A. Gardner, The “States-as-Laboratories” Metaphor in State Constitutional
Law, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 475, 477 (1996).
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national programs have helped in limited respects they have also led to
more problems.238 The Obama administration’s Race to the Top
program yielded some positive results.239 This grant-based program
incentivized states to make improvements to their education systems by
raising standards and emphasizing a focus on college and career
readiness.240 Through the program, forty-six states and the District of
Columbia submitted comprehensive reform plans, $4 billion was granted
to nineteen states, and thirty-four states modified their education laws to
focus on enhancing college and career readiness standards.241 No Child
Left Behind has a great name, but is well-cited for creating more
problems than solutions.242 No Child Left Behind focused heavily on
accountability by requiring schools to measure and document how
students performed on testing and instituting more severe consequences
when they did not perform well.243 The Act was helpful because it
required schools to break down the performance rates by race, an area
that lacked accountability in many schools.244 Negative consequences
of the Act included increased pressure on teachers to teach to the test,

238. See Mehta, supra note 231, at 105–06 (explaining that while U.S. national initiatives
have “generated progress in some areas,” U.S. schools still rank in the middle of international
educational rankings).
239. See Race to the Top, WHITE HOUSE, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/
education/k-12/race-to-the-top [https://perma.cc/3VFT-TUN6] (recognizing the Race to the Top
initiative “created robust plans” and dedicated billions of dollars to address K-12 education reform).
240. See id. (stressing the program’s four key areas of reform: (1) Development of rigorous
standards and better assessments; (2) Adoption of better data systems to provide schools, teachers,
and parents with information about student progress; (3) Support for teachers and school leaders to
become more effective; and (4) increased emphasis and resources for the rigorous interventions
needed to turn around the lowest performing schools).
241. Id.
242. See Valerie Strauss, No Child Left Behind’s Test-Based Policies Failed. Will Congress
Keep Them Anyway?, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
answer-sheet/wp/2015/02/13/no-child-left-behinds-test-based-policies-failed-will-congress-keepthem-anyway/ [https://perma.cc/N6TC-QEDR] (indicating issues caused by the Act’s specific
focus on accountability and test-based assessments included inequitable distribution for
opportunities for children to grow, learn and thrive); see also Christopher W. Holiman, Leaving No
Law Student Left Behind: Learning to Learn in the Age of No Child Left Behind, 58 HOWARD L.J.
195, 205–07 (2014) (outlining the harsh reality of the No Child Left Behind initiative’s
consequential effects in improvised and high-minority communities).
243. See Holiman, supra note 242, at 204–05 (explaining how the program’s standards
overlook the problem and punish teachers for bad results).
244. Id.
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penalties disproportionally impacting communities of color, and
discouraging students who did not perform well on high stakes tests.245
Despite efforts to address problems with education, inequalities persist
and U.S. school rankings have not improved.246 The American
education system was developed during the Progressive Era with a
particular focus on White students, the majority of whom were able to
graduate high school.247 This reason, among others, is why our
education system produces comparatively worse results than other
countries.248 In the 1960s, a high school education was good enough to
enter into middle-class occupations, such as manufacturing, and some
scholars posit that, as a country, we were content with that for quite some
time.249 Our current education system was not created for students of
color, and, as a result, is not equipped to correct issues in our current
education system.250 This is especially true in Texas where the vestiges
of segregation and discrimination affect how we finance education.251
B. Internationally
So, how do more successful countries in the area of education approach
education?252 Canada, Japan, Finland, Singapore, and South Korea all
rank higher than the United States on the International Student

245. Id. at 202–03.
246. See Mehta, supra note 231, at 105–06 (analyzing how reforms have led to progress in
some areas, but the U.S. education system still ranks in the middle of international rankings).
247. See id. at 107–08 (expounding on the ways the formation of the contemporary
educational system failed to include concerns particular to non-White students).
248. See id. at 105, 108 (2013) (linking the formation of the contemporary American
education system to its current outcomes, especially when compared to other countries).
249. See id. (concluding Americans tolerated the system because most White students
graduated and were qualified for these positions, regardless of how much they actually learned in
school).
250. See id. (reinforcing how the Progressive Era’s focus on White students inherently
excluded non-White students).
251. See generally Arnoldo De Leon & Robert Calvert, Segregation, TEX. ST. HIST.
ASS’N, https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/segregation [https://perma.cc/5FEW-J8CK]
(summarizing the history of school segregation in Texas and noting how “[i]n the early twentieth
century, Black and Mexican schools faced lamentable conditions endemic in an antiquated
educational system, and educational reforms of the Progressive era did not improve matters.”).
252. See Mehta, supra note 231, at 105, 107 (emphasizing the need for the United States to
borrow the different ideas countries currently atop the international ranking utilize in their
educational system).
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Assessment, and each have similarities in their approach to education.253
Rather than focusing disproportionally on accountability, these countries’
approach to education focus on creating the “profession of education.”254
This involves an active attempt at attracting the most talented graduates
into the teaching profession and providing them extensive training.255
As a result, the profession of teaching in these countries is considered a
very distinguished occupation and garners significant respect.256 Due to
significant training, there is less need for extensive accountability, and
teachers have greater freedom to teach their subjects as they see fit rather
than a one-size-fits-all mold.257 Another thing these countries all have
in common is that their education systems are all supported by a
significant welfare system.258
It is easy to see why there are many arguments against using
comparisons of education systems in other countries.259 The United
States is uniquely situated in many aspects, so looking at what other
countries do may seem to have little value.260 For example, the United
States has a much larger land mass than many other countries and does
not have a uniform application of many education policies because the
states have a right to dictate education as they see fit.261 In addition, the
253. Id.
254. See id. (comparing other countries’ commitment to making education a strong
profession, whereas the United States focuses on accountability).
255. See id. (“[Other countries] choose their teachers from among their most talented
graduates, train them extensively, create opportunities for them to collaborate with their peers
within and across schools to improve their practice, provide them the external supports that they
need to do their work well, and underwrite all these efforts with a strong welfare state.”).
256. See, e.g., id. at 105, 112 (2013) (sharing how teaching in Finland is a highly selective
program which only accepts one in every ten applicants).
257. See Holiman, supra note 242, at 202–03 (2014) (sharing the way standardized tests
impede a teacher’s discretion and the students through a one-size-fits-all method).
258. See Mehta, supra note 231, at 105, 107 (detailing how other countries create peer
collaborative opportunities across schools and provide external support to teachers, all funded from
the welfare state program).
259. See Sean Cavanaugh, U.S. Education Pressured by International Comparisons,
EDUC. WK. (Jan. 9, 2012), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2012/01/12/16overview.h31.html,
[https://perma.cc/BMB5-7MFZ] (describing how a single-policy analysis does not take into
account the role culture plays in education).
260. See, e.g., id. (illustrating how the unique culture in Japan plays an important factor in
their education system).
261. See Mehta, supra note 231, at 109 (noting how the decentralized education system in
the United States limits the federal government’s ability to establish uniform teaching standards
throughout the nation).
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United States has an ethnically diverse population and a relatively recent
history of attempting to overcome issues of slavery and discrimination in
the education system.262 These differences complicate the United
States’ ability to apply methods used in more homogenous countries.263
However, there is value in analyzing successful education models
because they can change our perspective regarding valuing and funding
education in Texas and the United States.264
V. SOLUTIONS
A. The Need for a Change in Thinking
An examination of school finance in Texas shows despite efforts to
improve education by funding it properly, there is significant resistance
to funding methods that require people to expend resources on something
they will not be able to benefit from in the short term.265 Evidence of
this idea can be seen in HB 3’s resistance to recapture, which scaled back
recapture payments for school districts and laid the foundation for further
scale back in the future.266
Evidence can also be found in resistance to taxes.267 In 2019,
Proposition 4 passed in Texas.268 Proposition 4 is a Texas Constitutional

262. See Mehta, supra note 231, at 106 (acknowledging how huge gaps continue to divide
students by race and class even after the United States ended segregation half a century ago).
263. See Cavanaugh, supra note 259 (detailing factors that differentiate the U.S.’s
educational system from other countries, such as societal and cultural norms).
264. See id. (echoing the need to understand how different countries produce higher
educational results and to prevent the United States from falling behind).
265. See Don’t Get Distracted by Recapture: Our Biggest School Finance Challenge Is a
Lack of Revenue, EVERY TEXAN (Nov. 13, 2018), http://bettertexasblog.org/2018/11/dont-getdistracted-by-recapture-our-biggest-school-finance-challenge-is-a-lack-of-revenue/ [https://perma
.cc/LQ7D-W2FJ] (noting the advantages and benefits of paying taxes in Texas are not immediate,
but to support the future).
266. See Leo Lopez, Recapture Formula Changes and Reductions Under House Bill 3,
TEX. EDUC. AGENCY (July 25, 2019), https://tea.texas.gov/sites/default/files/TAA%20-%20
Recapture%20pursuant%20to%20House%20Bill%203.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8YGY-VPSU]
(detailing how the passing of HB 3 will reduce recapture in the next biennium by $3.6 billion).
267. See Alex Samuels, Texas Voters Approve State Income Tax Ban, Most Other
Constitutional Amendments, TEX. TRIB. (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.texastribune.org/2019/
11/05/texas-constitutional-amendments-uniform-election-results-2019/ [https://perma.cc/BM9MM9K4] (recognizing seventy-five percent of Texans voted against state income tax).
268. See id. (noting the state income tax ban, Proposition 4, proclaimed victory within hours
of the polls closing).
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Amendment eliminating the possibility of imposing a state income tax on
individuals, unless a future amendment states otherwise.269 Although
there are many valid arguments in favor of this outcome, the amendment
removes funding possibilities the Texas education system could have
benefited from.270 Now that Proposition 4 has passed, there is little
opportunity for creative legislation taxing ultra-wealthy individuals a
significant amount for the benefit of education.271 There is also a lost
opportunity to have valuable debate in the future about how to fund public
services such as education, transportation, and health care.272 The
amendment was also framed in a way to unfairly instill fear in Texan
voters.273 Proposition 4 was framed in a way that created alarm and may
have led some voters to believe if they did not vote for it, they would
become subject to an income tax.274 The Texas Constitution already
ensures voters retain control over whether or not to ever create an income
tax which makes the proposition unnecessary.275 States without an
income tax rely on 39% of revenue from property taxes, while states with
an income tax rely on only 31% of revenue from property taxes.276 In
addition, states that have sales, income, and property taxes have more
269. Id.
270. See Dick Lavine, CPPP Opposes Proposition 4 on the Statewide Ballot This Fall:
Harmful Proposition Would Tie the Hands of Future Texans, EVERY TEXAN (July 2019),
http://forabettertexas.org/images/IT_2019_Oppose_Prop4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5M4P-ELMC]
(reiterating how the amendment would place hurdles for public services funding such as education).
271. Cf. Id. (describing how states without an income tax lead low-income and middleincome families to be taxed more heavily than higher-income families).
272. See id. (stating how the passing of Proposition 4 would place further hurdles for future
Texan generations to overcome in order to support public services such as education).
273. See Luis Figueroa, You Don’t Need Proposition 4 to Protect You from a Texas Income
Tax, CALLER TIMES (Oct. 15, 2019, 2:52 PM), https://www.caller.com/story/opinion/2019/10/15/
you-dont-need-proposition-4-protect-you-texas-income-tax/3988796002/ [https://perma.cc/6JPU6VDP] (“Fear is a tactic politicians use to scare and distract voters from the real threat. This tactic
is on full display in this November’s election in the form of Proposition 4, which would needlessly
ban the Texas Legislature from adopting an income tax.”).
274. See id. (“Proposition 4 is completely unnecessary and based on fake threats” while
“[t]he real threat to the future prosperity of our state is the greater tax burden that Texas already
places on the backs of the poor and middle class.”).
275. See Lavine, supra note 270 (“The ‘Bullock Amendment,’ adopted in 1993 (Art. 8, sec.
24), gives voters final control over any future income tax by requiring approval by a statewide
referendum before an income tax could take effect. . . . Proposition 4 would repeal the Bullock
Amendment and its protections, leaving a complete prohibition against the Legislature ‘imposing
a net income tax on individuals.’”).
276. Id.
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stable economics and are less vulnerable to economic downturn.277
Importantly, states without an income tax take a higher proportion of
funding from low- and middle-income families than they do of highincome families.278 This fact is indicative legislation like Proposition 4
is for the benefit of people with large amounts of wealth.279 Rather than
being afraid of taxes, Texan voters need to engage in substantive debate
about what methods of generating revenue will be beneficial for Texas in
the years to come.280 Legislation seems to always be two steps behind
in remedying a need for more money due to inflation and a rapidly
growing Texas population.281
B. Is Money the Answer?
Many have raised the argument Texas is giving a satisfactory amount
of funding for education because more money will not necessarily
translate to better-quality education.282 While it is true money should be
spent in a targeted and efficient manner, research shows money does
matter.283 There are several factors—including money—directly
influencing the success of a child’s education.284 Better literacy skills
among teachers, decreased class size, and experienced teachers of five

277. See id. (“States with three major sources of tax revenue can balance the advantages
and disadvantages of each type of tax—particularly their fairness and volatility—to achieve a stable
source of support. . . . [In contrast,] States without an income tax are more susceptible to economic
fluctuations.”).
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See id. (indicating the need for alternatives other than the two major sources of revenue
Texas relies upon).
281. See id. (opining the Legislature failed to consider future Texans’ needs).
282. See Ronald F. Ferguson, Paying for Public Education: New Evidence on how and Why
Money Matters, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 465, 488 (1991) (“The research that this Article describes
strongly supports the conventional wisdom that higher-quality schooling produces better reading
skills among public school students and that when targeted and managed wisely, increased funding
can improve the quality of public education.”).
283. See, e.g., id. at 470, 483, 489 (“[N]ew studies are beginning to find evidence that
money affects the quality of schooling and that the quality of schooling influences not only test
scores but later earnings as well.”).
284. See id. at 466, 484, 487, 489–90 (evidencing teacher quality maters and should also be
a major focus for school districts because skilled teachers “are the most critical of all schooling
inputs . . . and may positively affect a student’s test scores).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2021

35

The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice, Vol. 23 [2021], No. 1, Art. 3

92

THE SCHOLAR

[Vol. 23:57

years or more all predict better student scores on exams.285 Arguably
one of the most important factors is the quality of the teachers.286
Experience and skills training are two factors that increase the quality of
a teacher.287 Teachers with strong skills and significant experience
affect how well students perform on tests and ensure students have a
quality education.288 Quality teachers are unsurprisingly attracted to
locations paying higher salaries and areas where students come from a
higher socioeconomic status.289 Higher salaries and socioeconomic
status both contribute to education inequities between school districts.290
Although money spent on increasing teacher salaries in general helps
teachers, alone it is unlikely to be effective in improving student
performance.291 On the other hand, a study shows that increasing teacher
salaries and incentivizing quality teachers to move to areas where student
performance is low does help to improve student performance.292 The
study’s credibility is increased by the fact it controls for outside factors
that greatly influence the performance of children in school, such as

285. See id. at 465, 488 (“Results show that better literacy skills . . . among teachers, fewer
large classes, and more teachers with five or more years of experience . . . all predict better student
test scores . . . .”).
286. See id. at 465, 490 (suggesting teacher quality matters and should be a major focus in
the efforts to upgrade the quality of schooling).
287. See id. at 465, 476 (“Teachers with more years of experience produce higher student
test scores, lower dropout rates, and higher rates of taking the SAT.”).
288. See, e.g., id. at 465, 476, 482 (providing high school teachers with at least nine years’
experience positively impact students compared to non-high school teachers and teachers with less
than five years’ experience).
289. See id. at 465, 466 (“[E]qualizing salaries will not attract equally qualified teachers”
to areas with lower economic status); see also Carver-Thomas & Hammond, supra note 221, at 14
(explaining students of color and low-income students experience a “revolving door” of less
experienced teachers due to high turnover rates).
290. See Ferguson, supra note 282, at 465, 466 (claiming schools with higher salaries and
locations in wealthier neighborhoods provide more incentives and attract qualified teachers to the
district).
291. See id. at 465, 467 (“For the state as a whole, however, upgrading the quality of
schooling would require more than salary differentials that rearranged how teachers distributed
themselves across competing school districts. Primarily, it would require measures to assist
existing teachers in efforts to upgrade their skills, to retain talented and experienced teachers, and,
over the longer term, to attract academically stronger candidates of all races into primary and
secondary school teaching.”).
292. See id. at 465, 489 (proposing a state policy allowing “districts with lower socioeconomic status” to “pay higher salaries” is necessary to ensure each school districts get their
proportionate share of quality teachers).
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issues with family and home environment.293 Because teacher
experience and skill level are so critical in improving student
performance, money spent on increasing the number and quality of
teachers absolutely matters.294 One recommendation for improving
Texas public school education is to spend money on improving the
quality of teachers, such as teacher training, and to implement a policy
incentivizing teachers to teach in lower socioeconomic districts.295
C. Prioritizing Communities Needing Assistance
The most recognizable program that incentivizes districts needing
assistance is Teach For America.296 Under this model, recruited
members enter the program committed to teaching in areas of high
need.297 While teaching in schools, the recruits complete assignments
and can earn their certification, serving as a significant recruitment
incentive.298 Recruited members are required to commit to their
assignments for two years, and then if their district makes them an offer
to continue, they can take it, choose to leave teaching, or apply for another
teaching job in a different district.299 While these programs fill an
immediate need and are arguably good programs for young professionals
to get teaching experience, they are not ideally suited for students because
they form a bond with these teachers who often leave their learning
environments.300 Teach For America and other similar short-term
programs have the best of intentions, but statistics suggest they contribute

293. Id. at 465, 478 (“[C]onditions in home and community environments outside of the
school are important detriments of schooling outcomes.”).
294. See id. at 465, 475, 489 (“Since more and better teachers can help to raise standardized
test scores and higher salaries attract more and better teachers, money matters for raising test
scores.”).
295. Id. at 465, 489–90.
296. What We Do, TEACH FOR AM., https://www.teachforamerica.org/what-we-do,
[https://perma.cc/A24Y-QTXG] (“Teach For America is a diverse network of leaders who confront
educational inequity by teaching for at least two years and then working with unwavering
commitment from every sector of society to create a nation free from this injustice.”).
297. See id. (“Teach For America recruits outstanding and diverse leaders to become TFA
“corps members. . . . who commit to teach for two years in a low-income community . . . .”).
298. Teaching in the Corps, TEACH FOR AM., https://www.teachforamerica.org/life-in-thecorps/teaching-in-the-corps [https://perma.cc/ZR4X-SSA].
299. TEACH FOR AM., supra note 196.
300. See Carver-Thomas & Hammond, supra note 221, at 14 (recognizing teacher turnover
affects low income minority students at a higher rate).
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to the problem of teacher turnover and often create instability in
schools.301 Statistically, inexperienced teachers who are teaching in
low-income areas with higher concentrations of people of color will move
to a different school or leave the profession at significantly higher
rates.302 Nationally, turnover rates are 70% higher for teachers who
serve in the largest concentrations of students of color, and this
percentage increases for teachers in math and sciences, disability, and
English as a second language.303
To incentivize teachers to stay, school districts should emphasize or
create programs that build home-grown teachers by offering competitive
salary packages in comparison to other professions in the area.304
Districts who are unable to outright increase teacher salary figures should
offer the greatest amount they can and focus on creating a work
environment that encourages teachers to stay put.305 Although
competitive pay is a factor teachers cite as a reason to leave their schools,
teachers are greatly influenced by factors such as supportive school
leadership and teacher preparedness, or opportunities for training.306
Schools should remain aware of and advocate for legislative
opportunities to level the inequalities in school finance across districts in
an effort to curb inter-district teacher attrition because although more
money is not the only answer, it would certainly help.307
D. Big Business as an Imbedded Source of Funds for School Finance
The bottom line is Texas needs more revenue to adequately fund its
public schools and employees, but the average person does not want to

301. See id. at v, 1–4 (discussing the financial hardships and negative impact of programs
that allow teachers to move after a short period of time).
302. Id. at 14.
303. Id. (analyzing the varying impact of teacher turnover on different subjects in schools
with a large minority student population).
304. See id. (urging school districts to create “grow your own” systems that capitalize on
recruiting local community members and underwrites the costs of teacher attrition).
305. See Derek W. Black, Taking Teacher Quality Seriously, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1597, 1617–19, 1665–67 (2015) (commenting on how teachers are more likely to leave a school
based on a poor work environment rather than salary).
306. Carver-Thomas & Hammond, supra note 221, at 32–34.
307. See Black, supra note 305, at 1615–16 (drawing the connection of low-salaried
teachers to the quality and employment decisions made).
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pay higher taxes.308 Many folks have a hard time paying their taxes as
they are.309 Low and moderately wealthy people should not have to bear
the burden of providing the extra tax revenue that would make their
schools adequately funded.310 The revenue needed should not come
from small businesses struggling to stay in business.311 Rather, the funds
should be procured from large corporations who manipulate the taxing
system so that they pay the least amount of taxes possible.312
Amazon is a prime example.313 In 2018, Amazon made 11 billion
dollars in profits and paid no income taxes.314 In fact, Amazon received
129 million dollars in a tax rebate from the federal government.315 How
is it a company producing $11 billion in profits is able to evade paying
taxes, yet individuals of modest means struggle to pay their taxes every
year?316 The answer is simple, Amazon has the means to take advantage
of the system and exploit loopholes in the tax code.317 In addition, large
corporations like Amazon also have the means to employ numerous and
308. See Ross Ramsey, Texas Lawmakers Struggling to Find a Loveable Tax, TEX. TRIB.
(May 24, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2019/05/24/texas-lawmakers-struggleto-find-loveable-tax/ [https://perma.cc/YZ8B-S597] (referring to the history of disapproval for a
raise in taxes in the state of Texas).
309. See id. (discussing the disdain for taxes and the debate for how to provide more money
to schools without raising taxes).
310. See, e.g., DAPHNE A. KENYON, THE PROP. TAX–SCH. FUNDING DILEMMA 2 (Lincoln
Inst. of Land Pol’y, 2007) (“[P]roperty tax relief should be targeted to low-and moderate-income
households through a mechanism such as a state-funded property tax circuit breaker program.”).
311. Cf. Andrew Davis, Why Amazon Paid No 2018 US Federal Income Tax, CNBC (Apr.
4, 2019, 6:10 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/03/why-amazon-paid-no-federal-incometax.html [https://perma.cc/MC6F-73XD] (pointing out how a large corporation avoids paying
federal income taxes, which inadvertently signifies income-taxes are funded from smaller
businesses).
312. See generally id. (expressing discontent with what may be a corporate America tax
problem that allows big corporations to avoid paying an income tax).
313. Id.
314. Id. (noting the disparity between the surging profits acquired by a large corporation
and the income tax paid out by the same corporation).
315. Id. (discussing how large corporations such as Amazon, General Motors, Southwest
Airlines retain advantageous tax benefits in contrast to companies that are not a part of Corporate
America).
316. Id.
317. See Alyssa Pagano & Steve Kovach, Amazon Will Pay $0 in Federal Income Taxes
this Year—Here’s How the $793 Billion Company Gets Away With It, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 14,
2019, 9:07 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-not-paying-taxes-trump-bezos-2018-4
[https://perma.cc/YJM9-QFZK] (discussing how Corporate America, specifically Amazon, finds
new ways to avoid taxes).
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effective lobbyists that ensure changes to the tax code work in their
favor.318 President Trump’s signature tax bill has made it much easier
for large corporations to evade taxes.319 Prior to the tax cuts, the
corporation tax rate was 35% and it has since been cut to 21%.320 As the
United States is trillions of dollars in debt, the loss in taxes from large
corporations is sorely missed.321 Investing large amounts of money
within their company is one way that Amazon works the tax system to
their benefit.322 Some years, Amazon invested so much of its revenue
into itself that it did not make a profit.323 Amazon had zero net profit,
so the company qualified for certain tax breaks.324 Since 1997, Amazon
has had eight years of losses.325 These losses can carry forward and be
written off as future tax breaks.326 In 2018, Amazon had 627 million
dollars of loss that has cumulated and is now eligible to write off.327
Because it has invested so much in itself, Amazon has been able to
innovate in areas of artificial intelligence, consumer research, and
development in general.328 This information and innovation is then

318. See Davis, supra note 311 (broadcasting an interview with a tax lawyer who drafted
tax law for Congress who shares the consequences when corporate lobbyists have the ability to
influence the tax code).
319. See id. (emphasizing how changes to the tax code signed by President Trump allowed
corporations to slash their federal tax bills).
320. Jeff Stein & Christopher Ingraham, Corporations Paid 11.3 Percent Tax Rate Last
Year, in Steep Drop Under Trump’s Law, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2019, 3:11 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/12/16/corporations-paid-percent-tax-rate-lastyear-steep-drop-under-president-trumps-law/ [https://perma.cc/5RZ5-8DS2] (stressing how
President Trump’s signature tax legislation was the reason the corporate tax rate was lowered from
35 to 21 percent).
321. See Davis, supra note 311 (describing the thoughts and concerns economists have on
the consequences of the lowered corporate tax Amazon is benefitting from).
322. Id. (discussing how Amazon plows large portions of revenue back into itself to
cultivate long term growth and tax breaks).
323. Id.
324. Id. (discussing Amazon’s business practices and how such practices legally permit
them to pay zero dollars in federal income taxes).
325. Id. (“8 years of loses since 1997 Amazon IPO.”).
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. See id. (showing how large corporations, such as Amazon, in contrast to smaller
businesses use tax breaks to their advantage).
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eligible for tax credits.329 Amazon also receives tax credits for the
ordinary investment in things like building plants and buying
machinery.330 The weight of these tax credits were bolstered by
President Trump’s tax cuts and jobs act.331 The purpose of the tax cuts
was to help businesses that needed a break in an attempt to be more
successful, not so they could use the cuts as a way to avoid paying their
fair share in taxes.332 In 2018, Amazon had 1.4 billion dollars in tax
credits available to use.333 Tax credits were imposed with the purpose
of incentivizing businesses to invest in other American businesses to
benefit the economy.334
Some economists make the argument that large corporations like
Amazon should be able to evade paying taxes because it benefits big
business and when big business is doing well financially, the American
economy is doing great financially.335 However, this argument does not
hold up well when considering that the economy is not doing as well as
it should336 In other words, the supposed benefits of giving businesses
like Amazon large tax breaks do not outweigh the need for the revenue
they are not paying.337 Other scholars and analysts argue business like

329. See id. (reiterating how the 2017 tax legislation has only made it easier for Amazon
and other large corporations to evade taxes); see also Pagano & Kovach, supra note 317
(“[Amazon]’s tax payments are not keeping up with its great wealth.”).
330. See Davis, supra note 311 (identifying other ways Amazon manipulates the system by
discussing HQ2, the new Amazon campus that is up for discussion on where it will be built).
331. See Pagano & Kovach, supra note 317 (questioning President Trump’s attacks on
Amazon for not paying taxes after noting his efforts to make it easier for them to reduce their tax
bill with the implementation of the new 2017 tax cut and jobs act).
332. See Kevin Farnsworth & Gary Fooks, Corporate Taxation, Corporate Power, and
Corporate Harm, 54 HOW. J. CRIM. JUST. 25, 29 (2015) (evaluating the corporate-friendly type of
expenses governments aim to allow companies when they write off investment costs).
333. Davis, supra note 311.
334. See Farnsworth & Fooks, supra note 332, at 27 (discussing how governments are under
increased pressure to systematically cut their corporate taxes to induce businesses to invest within
their communities).
335. See id. at 26 (claiming some governments turn a blind eye to businesses evading taxes
when it can benefit their economy).
336. See id. at 35 (addressing the connection between lost tax revenue and state
governments’ inability to enact effective public policy).
337. See id. (analyzing the repercussions of corporate tax breaks on publicly funded social
programs).
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Amazon are being rewarded for researching and investing in things that
it would have already done.338
Another way Amazon ensures they do not have to pay federal income
tax is by paying their employees—especially higher-level employees—
partially in stocks.339 As a result, the company is able to subtract the
value of that stock off their taxes owed.340 As the value of their stock
increases over time, Amazon is able to write off increasingly large
amounts of money because the value of the stock when offered to
employees is lower than the value of the stock when written off.341
Amazon was able to write off eleven billion dollars in 2018 due in part to
stock-based compensation tax benefits.342
Amazon is only one of many big businesses avoiding the payment of
their fair share of taxes.343 Companies such as General Motors,
Goldman Sachs, and Southwest Airlines employ many of the same
methods in order to receive net tax benefits.344 Whether the practices of
these big businesses are good for the economy or not is up for debate.345
However, the country, especially its education system, needs this taxable
revenue from corporations.346 Similar to other states, Texas requires
338. Davis, supra note 311 (“Amazon’s low tax bill mainly stemmed from the Republican
tax cuts of 2017, . . . tax credits for massive investments in R&D[,] and stock-based employee
compensation.”).
339. See Pagano & Kovach, supra note 317 (“Amazon avoids paying federal taxes using a
variety of tax credits and tax exemptions that are legal and built into the U.S. federal tax code. [A]
big [tax credit] for this past year was the ability to deduct stock-based compensation for
executives.”).
340. See id. (condemning newly enacted U.S. tax legislation for continuing to allow
Corporate America to make large tax deductions).
341. Davis, supra note 311. See generally Matthew Yglesias, Amazon’s $0 Corporate
Income Tax Bill Last Year, Explained, VOX (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/2/
20/18231742/amazon-federal-taxes-zero-corporate-income
[https://perma.cc/G5B7-W4WV]
(detailing the process by which corporations use stock-based employee compensation to their
benefit and the implications on a Corporate America company’s federal taxes).
342. See Davis, supra note 311 (considering whether the United States has a corporate
income tax problem).
343. Id. (confirming Amazon is not the only Corporate America company utilizing and
receiving tax credits from the federal government to evade their tax bill).
344. Id.
345. See id. (illustrating the debilitating consequences of this behavior by big companies).
346. Id. (supporting the assertion that some people believe taxable revenue for corporations
are needed and highlighting local opposition to Amazon’s untaxed presence in their community).
See generally Hilary Russ, Corporate Tax Breaks Cost U.S. Schools Billions of Lost Revenue:
Report, REUTERS (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-taxes-subsidies-education
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Amazon to charge customers on the site a state sales tax.347 Amazon
offers a platform for third-party vendors to sell their wares and does not
collect sales tax from many of those sellers.348 Amazon leaves it up to
the third-party vendors individually to file and pay taxes in the state they
have established a sales tax nexus.349 Unfortunately, third-party vendors
largely fail to file and pay state sales taxes on the sales they’ve made
through Amazon.350 The amount of sales taxes that have gone
uncollected are sizable and could have been put toward Texas’s education
fund.351 This untapped revenue would help provide a stable source of
funds for education finance.352
E. HB 1525, an Example
The Revenue Sourced from HB 1525 should be directed to Texas’s
Education Budget. Collecting taxes from third-party vendors in online
marketplaces is difficult for a few reasons.353 Before 2018, state actors
/corporate-tax-breaks-cost-u-s-schools-billions-of-lost-revenue-report-idUSKBN1O30B3 [https://
perma.cc/RR3C-UR33] (outlining the negative implications large corporate tax cuts have on the
public education system across the United States).
347. See Edgar Walters, After Supreme Court Ruling, Texas Bills Would Bring in $850
Million in Online Sales Tax, TEX. TRIB. (May 3, 2019, 4:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/
2019/05/03/texas-bills-would-bring-850-million-online-sales-tax/ [https://perma.cc/VH4P-4PFU]
(reporting on the Texas Senate bill passed in 2019, allowing Texas to collect sales tax on internetbased vendors).
348. Pagano & Kovach, supra note 317 (“Amazon does a really good job at avoiding federal
taxes, and for most of its existence, it avoided charging you state sales tax. That’s because of a
Supreme Court case from 1992 that prevented states from collecting sales tax from e-commerce
companies. It allowed Amazon and other retailers to sell tons of stuff to you effectively tax-free.
By 2017, that all changed, Amazon started charging sales tax in all the states that have it, but it’s
not that simple, a lot of third-party sellers sell stuff through Amazon as well, and many of them
don’t charge sales tax.”).
349. See id. (detailing how e-commerce companies, such as Amazon, avoided the collection
sales taxes).
350. See id. (“[T]here are tens of millions of dollars every year in state sales tax that go
uncollected from third-party sellers”).
351. See Walters, supra note 347 (discussing how a proposed House Bill aimed at
e-commerce platforms can “require marketplaces such as Etsy, Ebay and Amazon to collect sales
tax on third-party, out-of-state sellers and is expected to yield more than half a billion dollars for
the state.”).
352. See generally Brian Stork, What About Our Future? The Chaos that is the Texas School
Finance System, 8 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. ON RACE & SOC. JUST. 307, 345 (2006)
(addressing the various ways to overcome school finance uncertainty).
353. See Walters, supra note 347 (detailing the intricacies of developing a sales tax bill for
the digital marketplace—vendors who sell goods in a state without a physical presence).
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were unsure whether taxing online marketplaces that do not have a
physical presence was even constitutional.354 Moreover, South Dakota
v. Wayfair Inc. held taxing these marketplaces is constitutional.355
Obstacles for the Texas state tax systems, however, still remain.356
Though the third-party vendors can be taxed, Texas has a fairly confusing
taxing system that does not facilitate an efficient collection of funds.357
Vendors aiming to comply with the taxing system face the challenge of
figuring out which sales tax rates to apply.358 Local taxing jurisdictions
in Texas have varying tax rates from 6.25% to 8.25%.359 Effective
October 1, 2019, HB 2153 was signed into law.360 This law allows the
Texas Comptroller to set one tax rate for vendors to use so their tax
calculations can be more streamlined.361

354. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2096 (2018) (holding States may
require companies without a physical presence in a state to their equal share of burdening taxes
and stating stare decisis could not support a “prohibition on the valid exercise of a states’ sovereign
power.”); see also Walters, supra note 347 (referencing the 2018 Supreme Court decision in South
Dakota v. Wayfair, declaring the practice constitutional and the subsequent state bills proposed in
response to the decision).
355. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099 (overruling previous precedent that mandated a
business have a physical presence in a state before a state government can collect state sales tax);
see also Walters, supra note 347 (reporting the Texas Legislature’s bill proposals to tax online
marketplaces after the South Dakota v. Wayfair decision).
356. See Maria Halkias, Texas Was Tougher Than Other States in Dealing with Amazon on
Sales Taxes, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Mar. 29, 2018, 5:25 PM), https://www.dallasnews.com/
business/retail/2018/03/29/texas-was-tougher-than-other-states-in-dealing-with-amazon-on-salestaxes/ [https://perma.cc/ZD6L-PTX8] (highlighting estimates that suggest Texas is missing out on
$1 billion in sales tax revenue from online retailers with no physical presence in the state); see also
Walters, supra note 347 (identifying the varying sales tax rates across local jurisdictions as an
obstacle and area of reform).
357. See Walters, supra note 347 (reporting the two bills introduced in the Texas Senate
intend to create a new mechanism for collecting sales tax from third-party vendors with no physical
presence in the state).
358. See id. (commenting how lawmakers intend to simplify local sales tax rates for online
vendors).
359. Id.
360. See George W. Rendziperis, Tax Update from the Texas 86th Legislative Session
(Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/tax-update-texas-86th-legislative-session
[https://perma.cc/XS2K-6H8Q] (reporting Texas’s response to the Wayfair decision to require
“remote sellers” to collect Texas sales taxes if they do “not have a physical presence in Texas” and
sell products or services in Texas of $500,000 or more).
361. Id.
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Also effective October 1, 2019 is HB 1525.362 This bill requires
online marketplaces, such as Amazon, Etsy, and eBay, to collect the
third-party sales tax revenue themselves and then direct it back to
Texas.363 Although third-party vendors sometimes had access to
marketplace tax collecting services, they were never required to prove to
the marketplace forum they were, in fact, paying sales taxes on the goods
they sold, and this is in large part why such a large bulk of taxes were
never collected.364 The estimated yield from these changes is $550
million in 2020 and 2021.365 Lawmakers are excited about finding
additional revenue from existing taxes because it means that there is a
little less pressure on the state’s Legislature to come up with needed
funding across the board when they get in a bind for cash.366 There have
been some proposals to use the revenue to decrease property taxes, but
this money should be spent on Texas Public Education.367
I recommend Texas voters and education groups lobby the Legislature
and demand legislation that takes the additional revenue from these taxes
to be directed to the Foundational School Program.368 This will be a
more dependable method of supplying some of the funding to schools on

362. See id. (noting HB 1525 benefits the state because it allows the collection of more sales
tax from fewer taxpayers, resulting in simpler compliance).
363. See Walters, supra note 347 (“HB 1525 provides that a “marketplace provider” is
required to collect, report, and remit taxes imposed on all sales of taxable items made through the
marketplace to the comptroller.”).
364. See Pagano & Kovach, supra note 317 (highlighting e-commerce platforms, such as
Amazon, whose third-party vendors avoid the collection of sales taxes).
365. Walters, supra note 347 (describing the benefits HB 1525 could yield by requiring
“marketplaces such as Etsy, Ebay and Amazon to collect sales tax on third-party, out-of-state
sellers . . . .”).
366. See Ramsey, supra note 308 (noting one proposed bill wanted to wipe out most school
property taxes which would require the Legislature to replace $30 billion of the tax revenues before
the next session).
367. See, e.g., Edgar Walters & Darla Cameron, From Property Taxes to Teacher Pay,
Here’s How the Texas Legislature Handled Spending Priorities, TEX. TRIB., https://apps.
texastribune.org/features/2019/house-senate-texas-budgets-2020/ [https://perma.cc/6WBH-9G8Y]
(updated May 31, 2019, 4:00 PM) (reporting how the Texas Legislature spent $5 Billion from their
state funds to cut property taxes).
368. Glenn Hegar, Texas School Finance: Doing the Math on the State’s Biggest
Expenditure, TEX. COMPTROLLER OF PUB. ACCTS. 7 (Jan. 2019), https://comptroller.texas.gov/
economy/fiscal-notes/2019/jan/ [https://perma.cc/Y2U4-W4VB] (explaining how the Texas’s
Foundational School Program is funded through a series of formulas determining the amount of
funding a school district receives).
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a regular basis.369 If the Texas Legislature were to use the remote vendor
tax as at least one of the methods of sustaining the funding HB 3 promises
to deliver on in the future, school districts will be able to rely more on the
money HB 3 has promised after 2021.370 Though grateful for the money
HB 3 affords them for allotments and school employee pay, school
officials are operating on the assumption the money backing these new
improvements will not last.371 The effect is schools cannot leverage the
new money coming into programs like special education or English
language readiness because the programs will fall apart the moment the
Legislature is unable to continue the funding.372
Ultimately, this type of uncertainty and instability negatively impacts
children and their educational development; using the revenue from HB
1525 can help remedy some of that instability.373 Pushing for this
recommendation may sound like a herculean effort, but it is not asking
too much.374 The Legislature could not ignore the flailing Texas school
369. See Public Education Reforms Lack Financial Stability, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS
NEWS (June 11, 2019, 4:29 PM), https://www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/editorials/article/Publiceducation-reforms-lack-financial-13969323.php [https://perma.cc/C3HC-EG2C] (urging the Texas
Legislature to avoid disaster by moving forward economic plans aimed at providing long term
sustainability for public education).
370. See Andrea Zelinkski, Texas Teachers Embrace $11.5B Windfall for Education. But
Will It Last? HOUS. CHRON. (June 13, 2019), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houstontexas/houston/article/Texas-Gov-Abbott-signs-school-funding-overhaul-13968483.php [https://
perma.cc/7K74-3EKD] (reporting on the nervous skepticism felt by Texas educators about the
long-term funding issues).
371. See Aliyya Swaby, With Conflicting Budget Estimates, Will Texas Teachers Get the
Pay Raises They Anticipated?, TEX. TRIB. (July 3, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.texas
tribune.org/2019/07/03/teacher-pay-raises-school-district-budgets/
[https://perma.cc/4RKK-65
SV] [hereinafter Conflicting Budget Estimates] (reporting on the feelings of uncertainty for
numerous local Texas school districts’ who remain unsure of whether the State will continue
funding to increase teacher salaries when the next legislature meets).
372. See Don’t Get Distracted by Recapture: Our Biggest School Finance Challenge Is a
Lack of Revenue, EVERY TEXAN (Nov. 13, 2018), http://bettertexasblog.org/2018/11/dont-getdistracted-by-recapture-our-biggest-school-finance-challenge-is-a-lack-of-revenue/ [https://perma
.cc/LQ7D-W2FJ] (stressing the notion Texas public schools are severely underfunded).
373. See, e.g., Tanya Reyna, A Look at Educational Inequalities in Texas, TEX. TRIB.
(Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.tribtalk.org/2018/01/29/a-look-at-educational-inequality-in-texas/#:
~:text=Over%20the%20past%20decade%2C%20Texas,a%20victim%20of%20educational%20in
equality [https://perma.cc/QBZ4-VKLD] (stating a 16% decline in per-student state funding
occurred for public education between 2008 to 2015 and can result in educational inequality).
374. See Ruth N. López Turley, Per-pupil Spending for Poor Students Is Too Low in Texas,
RICE: KINDER INST. FOR URB. RSCH. (June 2, 2020), https://kinder.rice.edu/urbanedge/2020/06/02/
education-disparities-spending-poor-students-too-low-texas
[https://perma.cc/ELX9-F8MY]
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finance system anymore and worked very hard to develop a bill that
promised to help remedy some of the inadequacies schools deal with
every day.375 The Legislature promised it would make up the difference
in revenues lost by lowering the recapture payments and focusing on
decreasing property taxes.376 Then, it is not too much to ask the
Legislature how they will make up the difference on a regular basis so
that the funding can be relied on by teachers and other school
employees.377 The communities Texas public schools serve cannot
afford to have the IOU come to nothing and leave our school finance
system even more vulnerable.378
CONCLUSION
We have long said we value education and we want to provide our
children with a quality one.379 But that is not quite true.380 In reality,
we have only valued education for some people.381 The problems that

(viewing the correlation between state funding gaps in per-pupil investments and gaps in student
educational outcomes and noting the need for educational equity to provide “all students the
resources they need to succeed . . . .”).
375. See Zelinkski, supra note 370 (recognizing the Legislature’s commitment to overhaul
funding of Texas’s public education and discussing the uncertainty and optimism a long-term
source for funding will be implemented before the 2021 legislation session).
376. See, e.g., Renee Yan, Carrol ISD Projects Lower Property Taxes, Recapture
Payments with New School Finance Law, CMTY. IMPACT NEWSPAPER (June 18, 2019, 2:37 AM),
https://communityimpact.com/dallas-fort-worth/grapevine-colleyville-southlake/city-county/2019
/06/17/carroll-isd-projects-lower-property-taxes-recapture-payments-with-new-school-financelaw/ [https://perma.cc/7QZL-GJVL] (showing how Carrol ISD expects HB 3 to increase its public
education spending while reducing the district’s property tax bills).
377. See Zelinkski, supra note 370 (expressing hope Texas lawmakers will “ensure their
HB 3 investment in education and property tax relief will be sustainable.”).
378. See Conflicting Budget Estimates, supra note 371 (emphasizing uncertainty on HB 3’s
sustainability come the 2021 Legislative Session).
379. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“Today, education is perhaps
the most important function of state and local governments. . . . It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. . . . In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed
in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.”).
380. See Albert Kauffman, The Texas Supreme Court Retreats from Protecting Texas
Students, 19 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. ON RACE & SOC. JUST. 145, 152 (2017) (emphasizing
disparities between poor and wealthy communities and the correlation to the quality of public
education).
381. See A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge, 18 June 1779, FOUNDERS
ONLINE (Sept. 29, 2019), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-02-02-0132-00040079 [https://perma.cc/2RTN-QTCU] (stating the initial bill applied to only certain children).
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we face with inequitable funding which disfavors students who come
from low-income communities stem from our past.382 When Thomas
Jefferson proposed “A Bill for the More General Diffusion of
Knowledge,” he attempted to bring the general public a step forward
towards a system of free education.383 But he left communities of color
behind.384 Whether such an expectation would have been practical at
the time is not the issue. The point, here, is we have consistently left
communities of color behind in our history and today is no exception.385
The education finance system was never built with both low-income and
minority populations in mind.386 These groups have disproportionally
felt the effects of inadequate funding primarily through higher teacher
turnover rates and instability in enrichment programs, which significantly
lessen the positive impact to the very students those programs are
designed to help.387 All public schools, specifically low-income schools,
are owed an assurance that state-contributed funding will come from both
382. See Luis Figueroa, Closing Thoughts on HB 3, the Big School Finance Bill, EVERY
TEXAN (May 25, 2019) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Race and Social
Justice) (proclaiming the inequitable tax compression creates funding disparities within different
communities).
383. See generally FOUNDERS ONLINE, supra note 381 (proclaiming “without regard to
wealth, birth, or other accidental condition or circumstances,” children should be educated at the
common expense of everyone instead of confining such education to a select group of individuals).
384. See id. (addressing how the bill specifically states public facilities apply only to the
free children) (emphasis added).
385. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58–59 (1973) (reiterating
how the Supreme Court did not recognize education as a fundamental right in a lawsuit brought by
members of minority groups who came from districts with lower property values); see also
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. 1989) (referring to the lawsuit
brought by the parents of children who lived in poor districts, whose access to opportunities for
educational funds was inequitable when compared to those children who lived in rich districts); see
also Brown v. Bd. Of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (illustrating the principle separate
educational facilities based on race was held to be inherently unequal and had a detrimental effect
on African American children).
386. See Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 392 (“School districts derive revenues from local ad
valorem property taxes, and the state raises funds from a variety of sources including the sales tax
and various severance and excise taxes. There are glaring disparities in the abilities of the various
school districts to raise revenues from property taxes because taxable property wealth varies greatly
from district to district.”).
387. See Desiree Carver-Thomas & Linda Darling Hammond, Teacher Turnover:
Why It Matters and What We Can Do About It, LEARNING POL’Y INST. 30–31 (Aug. 2017),
https://learningpolicyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/product-files/Teacher_Turnover_REPORT.
pdf (showing why there is a high turnover for teachers in areas where there is inadequate funding
in low income and minority populations).
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a stable and sustainable source of revenue.388 Hiding behind the
argument “money does not matter” is unacceptable.389 As a Texan
community, we need to change our thinking on how we view taxes. We
must understand an investment in education for lower income schools is
an investment that will benefit communities as a whole.390 A more
specific solution to the instability of HB 3 is to reserve the revenue from
HB 1525 for education finance.391 School districts should be proactive
and consistently advocate for a more equitable system of funding; these
districts must not wait to act until the system has become totally outdated
for their needs.392 Concurrently, Texas schools need to elevate the
profession of teaching by offering the best possible compensation
packages and rely more on home-grown teacher models of employment
as methods of retaining teachers because we know people who are
employed in their hometown are more likely to stay there.393 The quality
of education a child receives sets the stage for the rest of that child’s life,
and often the lives of those around them.394 Texas should invest in itself
and actively seek to minimize inequities in our education finance system
because children do not ask to be born, they do not get to choose how
wealthy their families will be nor where they get to live.395 The quality
of education children get and the start they have in life should not be
determined by chance.396 We have a moral imperative to give every
child an equal opportunity to a high-quality education.

388. See Figueroa, supra note 382 (admitting HB 3 lacks a sustainable source of funding).
389. Id.
390. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222–23 (1982) (“Compulsory school attendance laws
and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of
education to our democratic society.”).
391. See Walters, supra note 347 (reiterating revenue and uncollected sales tax from HB
1525 are considerable and should be redirected to Texas’s Education Budget).
392. Id.
393. See Carver-Thomas & Hammond, supra note 221, at vi, 4–5 (providing one of a few
key solutions where schools can improve teacher turnover rates).
394. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (recognizing education is the foundation and most
important function to our society).
395. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 396 (Tex. 1989)
(suggesting the system is both limited and unbalanced).
396. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (illustrating the need for quality
education and the purpose it serves to each community across the nation).
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